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Summary
Canadians pay very high prices for generic drugs compared to internaƟ onal norms. 
The reason is not ineffi  cient or uncompeƟ Ɵ ve generic drug companies, but provincial 
government pricing and insurance policies that are distorƟ ng the market. This paper 
by Professor Aidan Hollis, an expert in the economics of pharmaceuƟ cal markets, 
evaluates provincial government policies regarding generic drugs and proposes a 
new approach which could save governments and private insurers tens of millions of 
dollars a year.  
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Executive Summary
Generic drugs are becoming an increasingly important component of health care expenses in Canada. 
Thus, it is very important that the right policies are established to capture the benefi ts of reduced prices. 
Unfortunately, current policies across Canadian provinces fail to ensure low prices or early entry of generic 
products. This paper lays out key aspects of generic drug competition in Canada; presents principles for 
generic pricing and procurement; analyzes existing policies in Canadian provinces; and fi nally, presents a 
new approach for Alberta, with the potential to save millions of dollars a year.
The paper describes the structure of generic drug markets and the two obstacles to competition in the 
market for generic drugs. First, pharmacies are in a position to capture the benefi ts of competition among 
manufacturers, and for a variety of reasons, including insurance, consumers are reluctant to invest the 
effort to look for lower prices. Second, Canada’s laws make litigation almost a prerequisite for generic 
competition to occur; if the fi rm with the fi rst generic drug on the market does not benefi t from investing 
in litigation, no other fi rm have an incentive to challenge patents, possibly signifi cantly delaying the entry 
of other generics. It is important for policies to deal with both of these problems simultaneously.
Having described these characteristics of the market, the paper lays out seven principles which are 
relevant to generic drug-pricing and procurement policies:
there should be adequate incentives for innovation;• 
competition should be encouraged;• 
the benefi ts of competition should accrue to payers; • 
security and stability of supply should be encouraged;• 
prices should be the same for all buyers in a province;• 
a province should not enact a policy that harms all provinces if replicated elsewhere; and• 
pharmacies should be fairly compensated by all payers.• 
With these principles in mind, as well as an understanding of the obstacles to competition, an evaluation 
of the drug-pricing and procurement of Ontario, Quebec, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia fi nds 
problems with the approaches adopted in all of these provinces. 
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The paper then proposes a new approach for Alberta designed to obtain low prices for payers and fair 
treatment for pharmacies and manufacturers. The proposal contains the following elements:
A descending maximum price, with infl ation indexing• . The province should maintain a price schedule 
that provides for a maximum price for a generic drug that decreases with each additional entry 
into the market by a generic manufacturer — from 55% for one entrant down to 25% and below. 
The maximum price should apply across the province, in both the public and private sectors, and 
should be calculated as a fraction of the average price of the patented reference drug during the 
two years prior to entry. The lower price should apply to all manufacturers, and the maximum 
price should be adjusted each year by the rate of infl ation.
A cap on rebates or other considerations granted to pharmacies by manufacturers, whether directly or • 
indirectly. A limit of, at most, 10% of the price of the drug being sold should be set on rebates. 
The limit should apply in both the public and private sectors. In the event of a rebate above that 
amount, both parties should be penalized. Dispensing fees and mark-ups should be adjusted to 
ensure that pharmacies are fairly compensated. 
An open formulary• . Listing as a benefi t on the provincial formulary should be automatic upon 
meeting certain threshold requirements. There should be no need for generic drug fi rms to meet 
any additional requirements beyond having a Notice of Compliance from Health Canada and 
committing to being able and willing to supply the product at the listed price.
A “royalty” paid to the fi rst generic entrant that successfully challenges a patent• . As a reward to generic 
fi rms that enable competition through challenging invalid or non-infringed patents, the province 
should direct a temporary royalty to the fi rst independent generic that successfully challenges 
patents and obtains a Notice of Compliance to sell the drug. Only an independent generic, not a 
licensee or fi rm under the control of the patentee, should be able to obtain the royalty, and more 
than one fi rm should be able to share the royalty in some circumstances.
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Generic Drug Pricing and Procurement: A Policy for Alberta
Aidan Hollis
INTRODUCTION
What is the right strategy for the procurement and pricing of generic drugs? Canadian provinces have 
recently been experimenting with a variety of mechanisms to reduce the cost of drugs. There is a 
common assumption that once a drug is available generically, competition effectively will drive the price 
down, but because of special characteristics in pharmaceutical markets — especially insurance — this is 
not true. Retail drug prices consist of the net wholesale price, mark-ups by pharmacies, and dispensing 
fees. While generic competition drives down the net wholesale price, pharmacy mark-ups might increase 
to compensate, resulting in little, if any, savings for buyers. Ontario, in response, established maximum 
prices for generic drugs, which created an informal national standard in pricing on which Alberta relied. 
This model has disintegrated, as Ontario has successfully separated pricing for its public plan from that 
of the rest of the country. Generic drug prices in Alberta are now approximately 20% higher than Ontario 
public sector prices for identical multi-source products, though they are still lower than private sector 
prices in Ontario. This paper presents a review and analysis of generic drug procurement strategies across 
the country, and proposes a new mechanism for Alberta. 
In 2007, generic drugs represented 51% of total prescriptions fi lled in Alberta, and cost approximately 
$400 million.1 About half of this cost was borne by the provincial government. Thanks to the expected 
arrival of generic versions of several blockbuster drugs, it appears that generic drugs will be one of the 
fastest-growing elements of health expenditures in Canada over the next few years. Thus, given both 
the importance of generic drug expenditures and the extensive revision of drug procurement policies in 
other provinces, the time seems ripe for a review of Alberta’s policies. Of course, while this paper has a 
particular focus on Alberta, the principles apply equally well to other provinces, too.
Alberta has developed unique solutions in a number of areas to respond to its own particular needs and 
aspirations. Alberta was, in 1962, the fi rst jurisdiction in Canada to allow a pharmacist to substitute a 
generic for the equivalent brand written in the prescription.2 Alberta can continue to lead in its design 
of an effective set of regulations to enable savings to consumers to arise from competition among drug 
manufacturers.
Despite the importance of generic drugs, the problem of procurement policy in Canada has attracted 
little academic attention. A 2003 study of Ontario’s “70/90” rule, which operated from 1993 to 2006, 
• As will be evident from the analysis and discussion in this paper, determining the appropriate policy with respect to the 
pricing of generic drugs in Canada demands that close attention be paid to government legislation and that consideration be 
given to measures of cost and drug characteristics. An effective contribution to any understanding of policies with respect to 
generic drug pricing therefore demands access to information that is sometimes of a confi dential nature. Many individuals — 
employees of pharmaceutical manufacturers, pharmacies, insurers, employers, and associations — contributed to the formation 
of this paper through discussions, but have requested anonymity. I thank them for the generosity they showed in providing 
the information required for the preparation of this research. I also thank Wendy Armstrong, Herb Emery, Ron Kneebone, 
and Paul Grootendorst for their helpful comments and suggestions. Brogan Inc kindly contributed data-enabling comparison 
of private payer prices across provinces. In the interest of full disclosure, I have been a consultant to many generic drug 
companies in Canada, including Apotex, Novopharm, Cobalt, Genpharm, Nupharm, the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association, and the US Generic Pharmaceutical Association; to governments in Canada, both provincial and federal; and to 
consumer groups, all on matters relating to generic drug policy and competition.
1 IMS Health Canada, “Generic Dispensing Trends by Province, 2007”; accessed online (20/06/08) at http://www.
imshealthcanada.com/vgn/images/portal/cit_40000873/8/0/79016663Trends13_En_07CORR.pdf; and Canadian Institute 
for Health Information, Drug Expenditure in Canada 1985-2007 (Ottawa: CIHI, 2008).
2 Harold J. Segal, “The Canadian Health Care System: The Pharmacy Experience,” Journal of Research in Pharmaceutical 
Economics 5(3, 1994): 51-68.
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found that the rule seemed ineffective at reducing generic drug prices, since drug prices clustered at the 
maximum level permitted.3 The Fraser Institute has published a series of papers comparing Canadian 
generic drug list prices against those in the United States, arguing that the higher Canadian prices are a 
justifi cation for removing all price regulations on any drugs in Canada.4 A 2007 study examines a broad 
set of policies used in New Zealand for possible application in Canada, and suggests that tendering 
could be used to obtain low prices for generic drugs.5 And a 1992 study by Paul Gorecki reviews pricing 
mechanisms used at that time in Canada as well as a proposed mechanism.6 The key issue he addresses 
is the effectiveness of different mechanisms in ensuring that public insurers obtain the lowest available 
prices, so that the benefi ts of generic competition are passed on to the payer. The chief concern in 1992 
was the “spread,” or difference, between the effective price at which pharmacies purchased generic drugs 
and the price at which they were reimbursed. As Gorecki notes, “It appears that history is repeating itself. 
The two previous attempts to eliminate the spread in 1979 and 1984, while initially successful, saw its 
eventual reappearance” (p. 68). History has been repeating itself since 1992 as well, and the “spread” has 
continued to be a troubling policy issue, as we will see. 
An excellent 2007 study by the Competition Bureau of the generic drug sector provides a comprehensive 
analysis of how that market operates. A 2008 follow-up report offers policy recommendations, including 
suggestions for private payers to seek lower prices by negotiating for discounts with networks of 
preferred pharmacies. It suggests that public plans should coordinate across provinces and that there 
should be limits on the ability of pharmacies to capture profi ts through the “spread.”7
This paper briefl y reviews the nature of competition in generic drug markets, highlighting the points at 
which problems have arisen in Canada. It then introduces seven principles on which to base a generic 
drug procurement strategy. In light of these principles, the paper examines the cost-control strategies 
employed by the provincial drug plans of Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan, and 
shows that the strategies used in those provinces are problematic and might not be suited for use in 
Alberta. The paper proposes instead a market-oriented system that is structured to use private incentives 
to enable public and private cost savings. 
One complication of drug markets is that there are three types of “payers” in each province: the 
provincial government, employers that provide insurance,8 and patients. Ultimately, however, it should be 
3 A. Anis, D. Guh, and J. Woolcott, “Lowering Generic Drug Prices: Less Regulation Equals More Competition,” Medical Care 
41(1, 2003): 135-141.
4 In Brett J. Skinner and Mark Rovere, Canada’s Drug Price Paradox 2008 (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2008), the most 
recent Fraser Institute publication on this topic, the policy section begins with the statement, “If public drug-benefi t programs 
only partially reimbursed consumers directly at a fl at percentage of the price of the prescribed drug, all drug sales would 
be subject to market forces that would put downward pressure on prices” (p. 26). As it happens, that is exactly how most 
provincial drug programs operate. The paper continues, “The only customer is government and, because retailers all get the 
same reimbursement price, there is no incentive to undercut the competition on fi nal retail price” (ibid.). In fact, government 
is only half the market, and the private insurance plans actually pay higher prices than government does, despite not having 
fi xed reimbursement rates. The paper’s policy recommendations, all based on a comparison of generic drug prices in Canada 
and the United States, include repealing the ban on direct-to-consumer advertising and repealing price-control rules on 
patented drugs.
5 S. Morgan, G. Hanley, M. McMahon, and M. Barer, “Infl uencing Drug Prices through Formulary-Based Policies: Lessons from 
New Zealand,” Healthcare Policy 3(1, 2007): 1-20. 
6 Paul Gorecki, Controlling Drug Expenditures in Canada (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1992), especially chap. 5, 
which has a discussion of mechanisms used in different provinces.
7 See Canada, Competition Bureau, Canadian Generic Drug Sector Study (Ottawa: Competition Bureau Canada, 2007); 
accessed online (20/06/08) at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/epic/site/cb-bc.nsf/en/02495e.html; and idem, Benefi ting 
from Generic Drug Competition in Canada: The Way Forward (Ottawa: Competition Bureau Canada, 2008).
8 The federal government also provides drug insurance for certain groups such as First Nations peoples and veterans.
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recognized that all these payers are the same people: employees tend also to be taxpayers, and they often 
make co-payments for the drugs that are insured by their employers or by the province. In effect, drug 
insurance for employees is just a cost of employing a person, much like a wage, so higher drug insurance 
costs are simply refl ected in lower wages and/or fewer employees. While it is possible in principle to shift 
the burden of payments from the province to employers, such a move would really only shift the way 
that individuals pay for drug insurance. Thus, in this paper, I use the word “payer” to refer to the person 
or insurer that pays. Where I refer to prices paid by the public insurer — such as British Columbia’s 
PharmaCare or the Alberta Health Care Insurance Plan — or by a private insurer, I generally mean the 
price charged, some of which might be paid directly by the patient as a co-payment. Thus, high prices for 
the public payer create high costs for taxpayers and high co-payments for patients. 
Generic Drug Prices in Alberta
In 2007, the Government of Alberta spent approximately $887 million on prescription drugs through 
community pharmacies, while private expenditures (by both third-party insurers and out-of-pocket) 
totalled $980 million.9 About one-quarter of this spending was for drugs that are not patented. Table 
1 shows public expenditures on 20 commonly prescribed generic drugs in Alberta, and ratios between 
Ontario and Alberta drug benefi t prices. The ratios were determined using the lowest prices available in 
each province, and averaged 82% across these drugs — in other words, Ontario pays only 82% as much 
on commonly used generic drugs as Alberta does. The last column of Table 1 shows that, if Alberta had 
paid Ontario’s prices during the 12 months ending March 2008, the province would have saved $15 
million.10
9 Canadian Institute for Health Information, Drug Expenditure in Canada 1985-2007, p. 98; spending on drugs through 
cancer boards and hospitals is supplementary to this amount.
10 These fi gures do not include dispensing fees and mark-ups, which are, however, fairly similar between the two provinces 
for the public plans. Appendix 1 contains comparative details of these other fees.
Table 1: Government Expenditures on 20 Commonly Prescribed Generic Medicines,
               Alberta, fi scal year 2007/08
Molecule
Alberta Drug 
Plan Cost
Average 
Ontario/Alberta 
Price Ratio
Savings 
Potential
($) (%) ($)
Ramipril 12,189,840 0.76 2,962,808
Simvastatin 9,680,340 0.79 1,997,531
Venlafaxine Hcl 6,579,620 0.77 1,498,255
Gabapentin 5,964,050 0.79 1,230,599
Metformin Hcl 5,818,426 0.79 1,201,007
Alendronate Sodium 5,574,000 0.79 1,150,092
Pravastatin Sodium 4,189,587 0.79 863,594
Diltiazem Hcl 4,503,743 0.82 792,923
Paroxetine Hcl 2,865,823 0.79 591,360
Atenolol 2,172,857 0.79 447,575
Sertraline Hcl 2,062,407 0.79 425,576
Fentanyl 1,423,573 0.71 406,735
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While Ontario has reduced the public prices of its generic drugs, it has not shown any appearance of 
concern regarding the prices paid by private payers. Indeed, the difference between prices is such that 
private payers’ costs in Alberta, excluding dispensing fees, are about 10% lower than those in Ontario. 
(See Appendix 2 for a summary of private payer costs in all provinces.) Since the private market is 
about the same size as the public market, the average cost of a generic prescription is now slightly 
higher in Alberta, though the burden is allocated differently. This paper argues, however, not only that 
Alberta could do as well as Ontario, but also that it could reduce its own drug expenditures and those 
of private payers even further through an implementable solution. At the same time, these reduced drug 
expenditures need not reduce competition in the generic drug sector.
GENERIC DRUG COMPETITION
The generic drug industry is complex and widely misunderstood. Generic drugs — here used to refer to 
prescription medicines that are sold as “bio-equivalent” to a reference drug — are approved by Health 
Canada under special provisions of the Food and Drug Act and the Patent Act. Despite widespread 
perceptions of inferiority, generic drugs are tested in Canada to have the same clinical effect as branded 
products sold under patents. Indeed, a substantial share of the generic drugs sold in Canada is actually 
manufactured by or for the innovator companies. 
From the perspective of consumers and payers, generic drugs create competition, driving prices down. To 
compete, however, the generic manufacturer must obtain a “Notice of Compliance” (NOC) from Health 
Canada. An NOC is granted only when the generic company has met four requirements.
First, the fi rm must demonstrate to Health Canada that it has or can produce a product that is safe and 
effective. Thus, in general, the generic fi rm will have to develop a suitable drug. This might involve some 
chemical engineering work to ensure that the drug is properly formulated and developing the processes 
for production.
Metoprolol 2,690,262 0.86 380,153
Ciprofl oxacin Hcl 1,515,296 0.79 314,629
Olanzapine 1,482,488 0.80 300,190
Fluoxetine Hcl 1,376,954 0.79 284,187
Risperidone 681,081 0.79 140,572
Amoxicillin 739,020 0.96 30,487
Fenofi brate 2,855,151 1.00 0
Omeprazole Magnesium 12,548,940 1.00 0
Total 86,913,458 15,018,273
Note: Include only drugs insured under the Alberta Health Care Insurance Plan during the period from 
April 2007 to March 2008. Drug plan costs exclude dispensing fees. The average price ratio is the 
ratio of the prices of all dosages of each product sold in both provinces, using the drug benefi t 
prices.
Source: Sales information abstracted from Brogan Pharmastat Database. 
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Second, the generic product must be demonstrated to be bio-equivalent to the patented product. This 
typically means undertaking tests to show that the generic product has the same bio-availability in the 
bloodstream as the patented product; it also avoids the unnecessary duplication of expensive clinical 
trials.11
Third, since the generic fi rm is not required to undertake additional clinical trials beyond those required 
to show bio-equivalence, it must rely on the data produced through the patented product’s clinical trials 
to show safety and effi cacy. Therefore, the patentee also benefi ts from a period of eight years during 
which no other fi rm may rely on its data.12 The data-exclusivity period is often simultaneous with the 
patent period and in many cases does not delay generic competition; in other cases, the generic fi rm must 
wait for data exclusivity to end.13
Fourth, under Canadian law, patentees may link certain types of patents with drugs through listing those 
patents in the Health Canada Patent Register. To obtain an NOC, the generic fi rm must demonstrate 
that it has addressed all the outstanding patents linked to the drug in the Register. This requires that the 
generic fi rm give notice to the patentee that it wishes to sell the drug, specifying that it can do so because 
it believes that all relevant patents either are invalid or are not infringed. The patentee can then apply for 
a court order to prevent the generic drug from being approved, at which point there is, in effect, a patent 
lawsuit. In addition, because of special regulations that apply only to the pharmaceutical industry, the 
patentee is granted an automatic two-year injunction against approval of the drug by Health Canada.14 
If the patentee is successful in its application, the generic is barred from entering. If the patentee is 
unsuccessful, the generic fi rm may be granted an NOC and commence sales of the drug in Canada.15 
Typically, brand-name companies legitimately obtain several patents on their products over a period of 
years, of which some will be listed in the Health Canada Patent Register.16 In 2006, the average number 
of patents linked to each medicine in the Register was 2.26, although, for some medicines, particularly 
products with large sales volumes, the number of patents is much higher — one drug had 22 patents 
registered.17 A variety of inventions may be patentable with respect to a particular molecule. Patentable 
11 Such trials, which compare the effectiveness of the drug against a placebo, would be unethical in any case for products 
already demonstrated to be more effective than a placebo.
12 Section C.08.004.1 of the Food and Drug Regulations, as amended in October 2006, provides for a period of eight years of 
data protection during which no generic drug may enter. A supplementary period of six months is granted if the manufacturer 
performs clinical trials on pediatric populations.
13 Data exclusivity was extended to eight years in Canada in 2006.
14 In other industries, patentees must apply in court for an “interlocutory injunction” to sales by the alleged infringer to 
prevent patent infringement until a decision is reached on the merits of the lawsuit. Because of linkage between patents and 
the NOC, such an injunction is granted automatically. The injunction is vacated when a decision is reached in court within 
two years or if the parties settle. In Australia, there is no linkage, so that patentees must apply for interlocutory relief if they 
wish to prevent generic sales until a decision is reached in the trial. In that country, there have been six applications for an 
interlocutory injunction in pharmaceutical cases since 2003, of which three have been granted; see Wayne Condon, “Issues for 
Pharmaceutical Companies Doing Business in Australia,” Intellectual Asset Management Magazine, 2008, pp. 22-25.
15 Notably, even if an NOC is granted following a fi nding of invalidity in the application, the patentee may still sue the generic 
fi rm for patent infringement to stop the Minister of Health from granting an NOC. Evidently, if a court has already found a 
patent invalid in an NOC hearing, it is more likely, but not by any means certain, that a patent infringement action would be 
unsuccessful.
16 No criticism is intended of patentees who fi le multiple patent applications that are issued by the Patent Offi ce. Patentees 
may not be certain exactly which claims will be found invalid and which valid, and there should be no presumption that they 
fi le applications for patents that they expect to be found invalid. However, the uncertainty might lead to their applying for 
more patents than would be granted if the judge’s decision could be known in advance; this, in turn, means that many patents 
ultimately will be found invalid.
17 See Canada, Health Canada, Offi ce of Patented Medicines and Liaison, Therapeutic Products Directorate Statistical Report 
2006: Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations (Ottawa, 2007); accessed online (20/06/08) at http://www.hc-
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inventions relating to a drug may include the following:
• its basic composition, including new or alternative compounds; 
• the method of treatment, including new use of known compounds, different dosing, and therapies 
in combination with other drugs; 
• synthetic production; 
• its formulation and drug delivery; 
• prodrugs-releasing active ingredient; 
• substances resulting from metabolism in the body; 
• different crystalline or hydrated structures; 
• gene markers showing response to drug therapy; and 
• devices such as patches for administering the drug.18
Even within the category of basic composition, there are typically “originating patents,” where there is 
an originating invention involving the discovery of a new reaction or a new compound; and “selection 
patents,” which are based on a selection from related compounds derived from the original compound 
and which have been described in general terms and claimed in the originating patent.19 
 
Given the ability of patentees to apply over a period of years for a variety of patents, each of which can 
independently prevent generic entry, it is not typically the case that the “patent” expires.20 Instead, a 
large proportion of the drugs that become available generically do so only after the remaining patents are 
shown to be either invalid or not infringed. Thus, one of the most important requirements for generic 
competition to be enabled in a timely manner is for one or more generic fi rms to challenge the relevant 
patents. In the absence of such challenges, patentees would have an incentive to continue to make new 
patentable discoveries on which they could apply for patents. 
Canadian federal law contains a mechanism intended to deter baseless litigation by patentees under the 
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) (PM(NOC)) Regulations. Section 8 of the Regulations allows 
a generic manufacturer to make a claim for damages against a patentee for any loss the generic drug 
suffers as a result of an application made by the patentee that is later withdrawn or dismissed in court. In 
principle, this provision could provide some reward to the manufacturer of a generic drug that was kept 
off the market because of an invalid or non-infringed patent. In practice, however, no Canadian court 
has ever granted an award for such damages under this provision; moreover, even if such an award were 
granted, it would not effi ciently deter excessive patenting, as Appendix 3 shows.
Lipitor provides an extreme example of how brand-name companies can use the patent system to protect 
their products from generic competition. Pfi zer owns 17 Canadian patents on atorvastatin (Lipitor) 
that are listed in the Health Canada Patent Register, and any fi rm wishing to sell generic atorvastatin 
in Canada is required to address all the listed patents, the earliest of which were fi led in 1990 and will 
expire in 2010, while the latest were fi led in 2002 and will not expire until 2022. Health Canada fi rst 
granted an NOC for Lipitor in February 1997. While it is possible that some of the later-fi led patents 
would be found invalid in court, no one will know unless a generic company invests in challenging 
their validity. In the absence of such a challenge, the monopoly will last until at least 2022, while further 
sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/ patmrep_mbrevrap_2006-eng.pdf.
18 This list drawn from European Generic Medicines Association, Pharmaceutical Patents (Brussels, 2008); accessed 
(20/06/08) at http://www.egagenerics.com/gen-phrmapatents.htm.
19 This description is drawn from Pfi zer Canada Inc. v. (Minister of Health), 2006 FCA 214.
20 Not every class of patent is eligible for listing in the Health Canada Patent Registry, but all may be used as the basis for an 
infringement lawsuit.
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patents might be issued that would extend the monopoly beyond that date. The questionable quality 
of these patents has been revealed, however, by Pfi zer’s decision to license the fi rm Ranbaxy to sell an 
authorized generic atorvastatin; generic atorvastatin is now expected to become available in Canada by 
around 2011.21
The process of patent litigation — whether under the PM(NOC) application or under a patent-
infringement action — is both expensive and risky.22 Generic fi rms, like patentees, cannot know in 
advance which patents will be found invalid or not infringed; thus, to be successful, generic fi rms will 
in some cases have to be unsuccessful. In a way, this uncertainty renders the process of generic patent 
litigation similar to the process of research and development that leads to a drug in the fi rst place. 
Therefore, generic challengers must be “over-compensated” in cases in which they are successful in order 
to make such challenges profi table on an expected basis after adjusting the return for the probability of a 
successful challenge. 
Generic fi rms consider a variety of factors when deciding whether to invest in developing a product and 
face patent litigation, including the likelihood of success in litigation; the size of the market; the costs 
of production; the costs of litigation; and the prospect of competition from other generic fi rms and the 
branded product. 
Once one generic fi rm enters the market, other generic fi rms are also likely to enter since the patentee 
typically has relatively little incentive to prevent further generic entry. In many cases, multiple fi rms 
obtain their NOCs on the same day or in close succession. Patentees sometimes abandon litigation 
against other generics once one generic has been successful, since the loss of market share to the brand 
does not generally depend on the number of generic fi rms.23 
One approach that has become common in the United States — and that is certainly possible in Canada — 
is settlement of litigation that delays the arrival of generic competition.24 In the United States, these kinds 
of settlements are particularly noxious because of certain provisions in that country’s law that might 
prevent other entrants. Even in Canada, only a few generic fi rms effectively challenge patents, so that if 
a generic fi rms were to settle its litigation by agreeing to delay entry in exchange for a payment from the 
patentee, this might lead to signifi cant delays in the arrival of generic competition. 
21 Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited, “Ranbaxy and Pfi zer settle Lipitor litigation worldwide,” press release (Gurgaon, 
Haryana, India: Ranbaxy, 18 June 2008); accessed online (20/06/08) at http://www.ranbaxy.com/news/newsdisp.
aspx?cp=890&fl ag=LN. To be clear, this is not to suggest that the Pfi zer patents that will expire after 2011 are invalid, but 
merely to observe that Pfi zer appears to believe it possible or even probable that a court would fi nd them invalid or insuffi cient 
to exclude generic competitors. A more complete discussion of strategic patenting is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
a useful analysis highlighting key issues, many of which pertain to Canada, is available in European Generic Medicines 
Association, Pharmaceutical Patents.
22 Although I was unable to obtain detailed information on litigation costs generic fi rms face in Canada, reports indicate that 
similar challenges in the United States can cost US$20 million; see Sapna Dogra, “The Para IV Charm Continues” (Mumbai, 
India: Express Pharma, 1-15 August 2006); accessed online (20/06/08) at http://www.expresspharmaonline.com/20060815/
market11.shtml. The Competition Bureau notes: “Legal costs for the fi rst generic to challenge were said to be commonly 
in excess of $1 million and potentially much higher in complicated cases. However, the costs for subsequent generic 
manufacturers, for the same reference product, can be as low as a few thousand dollars when [Notices of Allegation] are no 
longer being challenged” (Canada, Competition Bureau, Canadian Generic Drug Sector Study, p. 14).
23 The failure of the number of generic competitors to have any effect on the market share of the brand-name drug might be 
due to the fact that retail prices of generic drugs typically do not change much as the number of generic suppliers increases.
24 The US Federal Trade Commission has been actively following the growth of these settlements, which increasingly tend 
to include a later entry date for the generic in exchange for no authorized generic during the 180-day exclusivity period. 
For more details, see United States, Federal Trade Commission, The FTC in 2008: A Force for Consumers and Competition 
(Washington, DC: Federal Trade Commission, 2008); accessed online (20/06/08) at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/03/
ChairmansReport2008.pdf.
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It is important to understand that, if NOCs are issued to several fi rms on or around the same day, there 
is no benefi t to being the generic fi rm that litigated: the most profi table fi rm will be the one that waited 
for litigation to fi nish and then entered without bearing those costs. Of course, if no fi rm has an incentive 
to invest in litigation but merely wishes to free-ride on the efforts of another fi rm, then patents that are 
found invalid or not infringed, if challenged, will, despite their weakness, effectively block competition. 
Any kind of policy analysis of generic competition should not act in ignorance of this key aspect of 
competition: that the timing of generic entry is not determined exogenously to the expiry of a patent 
but is responsive to the incentives for entry. This is important, since a mechanism that prevents the fi rst 
generic entrant from obtaining a reward for successfully showing patent invalidity or non-infringement 
will lead generic fi rms to decide not to invest in risky litigation from which they cannot earn a profi t. 
It is possible that, if the PM(NOC) regulations were substantially reformed to remove linkage, some of the 
problems of generic competition might be avoided. However, such an approach would also create new 
problems and uncertainties, and is outside the constitutional responsibilities of provincial governments. I 
therefore assume in this paper that all federal laws and regulations are unchangeable.
 
How Generic CompeƟ Ɵ on Works
The Branded Product
Once the entry of a generic has occurred, competition does not tend to follow the normal route. For 
one thing, the maker of the brand-name drug typically does not reduce its price in response. The 
reason for this is well known: the brand-name manufacturer is attempting to capture profi ts from those 
relatively price-insensitive consumers who prefer to choose the better-known brand.25 The brand-name 
manufacturer will also sometimes sue generic entrants for patent infringement, even after a decision 
under the PM(NOC) regulations, since such a decision does not determine infringement. A generic 
manufacturer that faces an infringement claim will have to manage its liability carefully, since it does not 
want to sell at a very low price and then fi nd it must pay back the brand-name manufacturer’s much 
higher losses.
Authorized Generics
The brand-name manufacturer also will often release its own “authorized” generic, typically the brand-
name product but labelled and priced as a generic. Such authorized generics might be distributed 
through an agreement with an unrelated generic fi rm or through an in-house arrangement. Authorized 
generics allow the brand-name manufacturer to sell its branded product at a high price and to participate 
in the lower-priced generic market. An important feature of this strategy is that the authorized generic 
generally will be marketed before or simultaneously with the fi rst independent generic, so that it splits 
the total generic sales volume. Thus, the benefi t of being the fi rst independent generic — that is, the 
benefi t from challenging patents — might be reduced by half or more.26
Thus, the authorized generic strategy is very attractive for the patentee: it discourages investment into 
patent challenges and it enables the patentee to obtain a share of generic sales while also selling at the 
high branded price. For the consumer or payer, authorized generics create some potential benefi ts as 
well as harm. On the one hand, if an authorized generic enters before any other generic, it enables the 
consumer or payer to buy the same product at a lower price. However, it does so at the cost of harming 
generic fi rms’ incentive to challenge patents, which, in turn, is likely to slow the entry of generics into 
other markets.
25 In Canada, however, the regulations of the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board (PMPRB) limit price increases to the rate 
of infl ation. Some provinces also restrict price increases.
26 A generic that enters alone benefi ts from high prices and high market share, while the authorized generic tends to split the 
market share and reduce the price and/or increase the rebate demanded by pharmacies.
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The InsƟ tuƟ onal Seƫ  ng and CompeƟ Ɵ on for the Pharmacy
Once patent barriers have been cleared, manufacturers of generics compete in a complex institutional 
setting, with each province having its own rules and regulations. There are, however, a few key 
similarities. To obtain sales in the public sector, the generic product must be listed as a benefi t in the 
provincial formulary. Typically, this means that the generic product must be priced no higher than other 
generics. The fi rst generic entrant might be required to provide a minimum discount off the brand price 
to be listed as a benefi t. The share of sales in the public sector varies by drug, but it averages about half 
the total expenditure. Private insurers tend to have more inclusive formularies, and in many cases they 
include almost all drugs that have obtained an NOC from Health Canada. 
Pharmacies choose to carry specifi c products based on their profi tability, so they will generally carry at 
least one generic product in each interchangeable group that is listed as a benefi t. In most cases, generics 
are priced at the same level in the provincial formulary, so that any one of the products will suffi ce. Since 
carrying multiple interchangeable products adds costs, pharmacies typically will carry only the brand-
name drug and one or two generics. 
The decision as to which generic product a pharmacy will carry is determined in large part by 
“allowances” or “rebates” the manufacturer pays to the pharmacy — what Gorecki calls the “spread.” 
Pharmacies typically negotiate with manufacturers the level of rebates or allowances they will be paid 
for a bundle of products, so it might not be possible to identify exactly the rebate for a specifi c product. 
Given a choice between different generics, pharmacies naturally will select the product or bundle of 
products that offers the largest profi t. Chain pharmacies such as Shoppers Drug Mart can operate on a 
national scale, and might receive allowances based on national sales volumes. Given different retail prices 
and mark-ups in different provinces, the commercial relationship between such chain pharmacies and 
manufacturers can be complex. 
Since almost all Canadians have some form of drug insurance, there is little personal benefi t in their 
trying to fi nd a lower price for a drug for which they pay, at most, a fractional co-payment.27 Moreover, 
many seniors, in addition to being covered by their provincial health plan, also have supplementary 
insurance through their former employers that covers drugs not included in the provincial formulary. 
This supplementary insurance might also cover co-payments required under the provincial plan. In many 
cases, pharmacies know who has what insurance, enabling them to price discriminate among customers 
based on their insurance status — although some provinces, such as Saskatchewan and Alberta, limit such 
discrimination. 
For sales of drugs to the public, provinces tend to restrict the size of the mark-up over the nominal 
wholesale price, as well as the dispensing fee.28 Pharmacies therefore fi nd it more profi table to buy drugs 
at a high list price and to receive rebates or allowances. If they purchase at a low list price — that is, at 
the same price net of the allowance — their net revenue is restricted to the allowed mark-up plus the 
dispensing fee. If they purchase at a high list price as well as receive an allowance, they can earn the 
allowance in addition. 
27 Out-of-pocket expenditures represented approximately 17% of total expenditures on prescription drugs in 2007 (Canadian 
Institute for Health Information, Drug Expenditure in Canada 1985-2007, p. 60), but most of these private expenditures are on 
co-payments for drugs that are insured under private or public plans. Such plans cover approximately 98% of all Canadians, 
although the extent of coverage varies (Canada, Competition Bureau, Canadian Generic Drug Sector Study, p. 3).
28 Private plans allow pharmacies to charge “customary and usual” dispensing fees and mark-ups; as a result, pharmacies 
differ considerably in the fees and mark-ups they charge for products outside the public plans.
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The effect of the combination of these formulary rules and insurance is that generic fi rms historically have 
not competed on the list price in most Canadian provinces. Instead, they tend to seek a listing of their 
product at the maximum allowed price, and to compete to get their products into as many pharmacies 
as possible. (The list price may vary between public and private plans, and between provinces.) All the 
public plans, and many private plans, will pay only an amount equal to the “best available price” in a 
group of interchangeable drugs (or, if there is a co-payment, some fraction of that price). This means that 
generic fi rms tend to match each other’s prices, and lowering the list price on a product does not increase 
volume but merely causes other fi rms to match the list price. 
Thus, generic companies can increase their sales by reducing the effective wholesale prices of their 
products without changing the list prices, historically through rebates, discounts, and free goods.29 
In 2007, such rebates were estimated to average 40% and to range as high as 80% of the list price of 
drugs,30 while my own discussions with generic manufacturers confi rm that rebates and other incentives 
for pharmacies continue to average at least 50% of the list price.31 In effect, generic manufacturers in 
Canada have been competing for market share by lowering the net price to the retailer without changing 
the list price payers face.32 
For their part, pharmacies tend not to use discounting on drug prices to attract additional business since 
patients are relatively price insensitive;33 they do, however, differ somewhat in the dispensing fees they 
charge, since these are less extensively covered by insurance and consumers are more price sensitive to 
them. Furthermore, most employers fi nd it diffi cult to bargain with pharmacies over price since they lack 
the ability to threaten to limit payments to them. Pharmacies, in turn, will require consumers to make 
supplementary co-payments, which leads to employee dissatisfaction with their employers’ benefi t plans. 
Unionized employees, on the other hand, are more likely to rely on union contracts and union bargaining 
power to force non-restrictive drug insurance plans.34 
The Core Problems in Generic CompeƟ Ɵ on
The discussion above can be summarized in terms of two core problems of generic competition that 
provincial drug policy must take into account if it is to be effective. First, there is the failure of generic 
competition to be refl ected in low prices for buyers and/or payers because of the presence of insurance 
for most drug purchases, so that patients lack sensitivity to prices. As a result, pharmacies cannot 
substantially increase market share by discounting generic drugs: it is more profi table for them to 
exercise market power through maintaining a high retail price.
29 Since these all have much the same effect, I use the term “rebates” to refer to any kind of off-invoice discount offered to a 
pharmacy.
30 Canada, Competition Bureau, Canadian Generic Drug Sector Study.
31 Other sources confi rm the large size of these rebates and discounts; see, for example, Vernon Chiles, Green Shield Canada, 
Letter to the PMPRB, 9 May 2005; accessed online (20/06/08) at http://www.greenshield.ca/NR/rdonlyres/E8DCE938-3672-
40E8-9934-4D08F6B98F14/0/AdvocacyMay2005PMPRB.pdf.
32 A similar phenomenon appears to have occurred in other countries. In the United Kingdom, for example, a recent study 
reveals that pharmacies obtain margins on generic drugs as high as 50%; see United Kingdom, Offi ce of Fair Trading, The 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (London: Offi ce of Fair Trading, 2007), p. 32.
33 In the United States, price discounting by some pharmacies is widespread — Wal-Mart offers many generic prescriptions 
for only $4 — which seems to suggest that, in principle, a different set of arrangements could lead to lower prices. However, 
various studies show that the average cost of fi lling a prescription in Canada easily exceeds $4. It is possible that Wal-Mart is 
using those prescriptions as a loss leader to attract more volume into its stores. It has also been suggested to me that Wal-Mart 
does not offer the same level of personal attention that would be expected in a Canadian pharmacy.
34 In Alberta, discounts offered to employers also have to be offered to both Alberta Blue Cross and the provincial 
government, thus limiting an employer’s ability to obtain discounts.
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Second, generic competition is often delayed because of patents that ultimately are found to be invalid or 
not infringed by generics. In almost every market that generics enter, patents initially shield the market 
from competition but are found wanting when competitors test them in court — and sometimes patents 
simply expire. While this might be a problem in the system, it is no fault of patentees who apply for, and 
are granted, patents that they legitimately use to block competition. Health Canada monitors patents 
to avoid inappropriate listings, but it cannot refuse to list patents that conform to its standards but that 
later might be found to be invalid or not infringed by a generic. Such a situation, however, demands an 
adequate mechanism to ensure that such invalid or non-infringed patents do not prevent competition and 
lower prices — and no such mechanism currently exists in Canada. Historically, the fi rst generic entrant 
has tended to achieve and maintain a higher market share than might otherwise have been expected, 
which has created some incentive to challenge patents, although as I describe below, this market share 
advantage is now under threat by new policies.
PRINCIPLES 
In view of the history and institutional setting of the use of generic drugs, provincial government policy 
should take in account a number of basic principles. 
Principle 1: Ensure adequate incentives for innovation. Provinces should respect the patent rights and 
data exclusivity of innovative fi rms and adequately compensate them through the prices paid. 
Principle 2: Encourage competition. This principle has two key parts. First, when there are no patent 
obstacles to competition, provinces should encourage an industry structure with many participants. 
Second, provinces should enable entry as early as is consistent with the patent rights and data exclusivity 
of the innovators.
Principle 3: The benefi ts of competition should accrue to payers. While manufacturers have competed 
aggressively against each other, this has not resulted in low prices for payers; instead, the competition has 
benefi ted pharmacies. 
Principle 4: Ensure the security and stability of supply. One way to increase security of supply is to 
diversify the sources of products; domestic production might also be desirable.
Principle 5: Prices should be the same for all buyers in a province. Although not everyone might agree 
with this principle, its underlying rationale is that the provinces, as large buyers, are in a far superior 
position to exercise bargaining power than are uninsured consumers who walk into a pharmacy with a 
prescription. A weaker version of this principle is that provinces, as insurers, should not obtain low prices 
at the expense of other consumers. This implies that governments should not knowingly facilitate the 
charging of high prices to uninformed consumers in order to obtain low prices — after all, governments 
have a responsibility to all their citizens, not just to reduce the burden of provincial drug insurance 
programs on taxpayers.
Principle 6: Policies should not harm other provinces. If one province’s policy harms all other 
provinces, it could lead to retaliation, which is inconsistent with the principles of Canada’s federation. If 
the fi nal outcome, after all provinces have retaliated in kind, is that all provinces are worse off than if no 
province had implemented the policy, then that policy is an undesirable one.35 
35 There is a range of policies that could be benefi cial for one province and harmful for another, however, and not all such 
policies should be condemned. For example, if one province reduced taxes for fi rms in a given industry, such a policy might 
harm other provinces if it induced fi rms to locate only in the province with the lower taxes, but no harm would necessarily be 
done if the other provinces provided an equal tax reduction. Clearly, however, a policy of discriminating against imports from 
other provinces would be harmful if all provinces retaliated in kind.
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Principle 7: Pharmacies should be fairly compensated by all payers. This principle requires, fi rst, that 
pharmacies should be adequately compensated for their contribution to the health of patients. Second, 
fair compensation requires that all payers — not just public or private ones — should make a proportional 
contribution to pharmacy revenues. Third, fair compensation requires that the contribution across 
different drugs be proportional among different molecules and between branded and generic drugs. 
With this set of principles in mind, one can now examine and compare policies regarding payment for 
generic drugs in four provinces — Ontario, Quebec, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia.
 
ONTARIO’S RESPONSE: HARD PRICE LIMITS AND NO REBATES
Historically, Ontario had a system in which the generic price ceiling was set at 70% of the brand-name 
price when the fi rst generic entered and 63% when there were multiple generics. Manufacturers paid 
large rebates to pharmacies, but prices paid by payers typically were not reduced below the price ceilings. 
Generally, all payers in the province paid the price listed in the formulary.
In response, the Government of Ontario elected to capture rebates by setting a lower reimbursement 
price for sales covered by the Ontario Drug Benefi t (ODB) program. Under the Transparent Drug System 
for Patients Act, 2006, the province now requires that the ODB reimbursement price of a generic listed in 
the formulary be capped at only 50% of the reference brand-name price at the time the generic is listed.36 
(An exception to the 50% rule is sometimes made for drugs for which there is only one interchangeable 
generic product.) The effect of the Ontario legislation has been a reduction of 15% to 20% in the price of 
generic drugs to the province. 
The Act also authorized the newly created Executive Offi cer of the ODB program to negotiate rebates 
with drug manufacturers.37 Such negotiations allow the ODB to list drugs at high prices, while receiving 
confi dential rebates. These rebates are likely chiefl y paid on sole-source products, although there is 
nothing to prevent their being used for generically available products as well.
The Act made the payment of rebates to pharmacies unlawful, and adjusted mark-ups charged by 
pharmacies as well as the dispensing fee.38 The Act did, however, allow manufacturers to pay pharmacies 
“allowances” for “professional services” to patients, such as patient education days, but, for sales 
insured under the ODB, these allowances cannot be greater than 20% of the price of the drug. Because 
the allowances must not be rebates, pharmacists are required to report the use of the professional 
allowance monies received for products dispensed under the ODB program, as well as the total amount 
of professional allowances.39 Such reporting might, however, create a substantial burden on pharmacies. 
Pharmacies can also be separately compensated by the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care for 
enhanced patient counselling and other professional services. 
36 See Ontario, Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Ontario Public Drug Programs, Offi ce of the Executive Offi cer 
and Assistant Deputy Minister, “Re: Submission Requirements for Generic Drug Products” (Toronto, 25 September 2007). 
Available at http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/providers/pub/drugs/dsguide/docs/submit_req_generic_drug_20071105.
pdf.
37 Ontario Drug Benefi t Act - O. Reg. 201/96, 12.1 (1) 7.
38 Pharmacies are permitted a mark-up of 8% on the ODB price, plus a dispensing fee of $7 per prescription.
39 Ontario, Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Ontario Drug Benefi t Program, “Notice from the Executive Offi cer: 
Reporting Framework for Professional Allowances” (Toronto, 6 March 2008); available at http://www.health.gov.on.ca/
english/providers/program/drugs/opdp_eo/notices/ reporting_framework_20080306.html. The total amount to be reported 
includes drugs paid for privately as well as those of the ODB.
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The Act also made a few smaller changes, including permitting the interchangeability of “same or similar” 
medicines, which, in turn, has facilitated the interchangeability of tablets and capsules; and it enabled 
“off-formulary interchangeability” so that generics could be substituted for brand-name drugs that were 
not listed as a benefi t in the formulary.
The “Transparent Drug System” and Private Payers
One of the most important aspects of the Transparent Drug System for Patients Act is that its chief 
application is to drugs sold in the public sector, so that there is now a separation between private and 
public sector drug prices. Private sector drug prices have stayed at approximately the old level, while 
ODB prices have fallen considerably; as Appendix 2 shows, there has been no signifi cant change in costs 
for private payers in Ontario since 2005. As of early 2008, for private plans, the price premium on generic 
drugs was approximately 30% over the public price (see Figure 1).  Similar differentiation applies 
to other fees charged by pharmacies: while the dispensing fee for ODB drugs is $7 per prescription, 
pharmacies may charge “usual and customary” dispensing fees of their choosing to other payers; such 
fees currently range from $1.99 to $16.95 for payers not in the public sector.40
 
40 Ontario, Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, “Ontario Drug Benefi t: Dispensing Fees” (Toronto); accessed 20/06/08) 
at http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/public/pub/drugs/dispense.html.
Figure 1: Private Payer Price Premium, Ontario, 2008
Notes: Figure shows the percentage by which private payer prices were above public payer prices for 
each product in the fi rst quarter of 2008. Prices include mark-ups but not dispensing fees.
Sources: Private prices are from the Brogan Private Payer Database; public prices are abstracted from the
ODB List.
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While rebates are not payable even for drugs outside the ODB, there is no cap on allowances relating 
to professional services. The set of services for which pharmacies may be paid is precisely defi ned by 
regulation. However, this set of services is quite wide, and probably enables some scope for creative 
accounting.41 Given that money is fungible, an allowance paid to support “pharmacy staffi ng costs for 
patient care activities, including counselling services” might be just as good to the pharmacist as an 
unrestricted rebate.
There are other reasons to suspect that it might be diffi cult to control payments to pharmacies. A national 
pharmacy chain can negotiate on the basis of stores in all provinces, and arrange that rebates be paid 
only in respect of sales in some provinces. Such a strategy, on the face of it, would comply with the 
Ontario regulations but in effect would be no different from a manufacturer paying the same total rebate, 
including in Ontario.
Industry participants have indicated to me that, if one were to treat professional allowances as rebates, 
the average level of rebates has not changed nationally since the implementation of the Transparent Drug 
System for Patients Act. Professional allowances are perceived as nothing more than rebates, and the fact 
that allowances are capped at 20% only for ODB sales is clearly meaningless, since this simply drives up 
the amount of allowances reported for non-ODB sales.
Ontario’s drug system thus has become, in effect, two systems. There is a public system, in which generic 
drugs are priced at 50% of the brand-name price, professional service allowances are capped at 20% of 
the generic price, and mark-ups and dispensing fees are strictly controlled. And there is a parallel private 
system, in which the same pharmacies render exactly the same services for the same set of drugs, but 
charge much higher prices, mark-ups, and dispensing fees, and are paid large “professional allowances” 
by generic manufacturers. In effect, the costs of pharmacy are being borne disproportionately by private 
payers, who receive the same services for much higher prices.
One might imagine that cash-paying consumers and employers should be able to negotiate better 
deals with pharmacies. That this is not easy to do is shown by the fact that no such deals appear to 
be materializing. The failure to negotiate lower prices is due to the lack of market power exercised by 
employers and patients. Moreover, insured patients lack incentives to search for low prices. A patient 
with private insurance who obtains a prescription from the doctor is not much interested in the price 
of the drug if it is covered by insurance. Even if a co-payment is required, it might be a fi xed amount 
or some fraction of the price, the out-of-pocket expense of which the patient hardly feels, particularly 
compared to the inconvenience of shopping around to other pharmacies for a product whose relative 
price is unknown.
This rather small elasticity of demand on the part of insured consumers means that employers, if they 
are to control expenditures on drugs by their employees and other insured parties, must either increase 
the size of co-payments, which tends to defeat the purpose of the insurance, or else negotiate with 
pharmacies to ensure better deals. Negotiating with pharmacies, however, requires the employer to have 
some bargaining power, and this essentially means directing insured patients to preferred pharmacies 
that offer better prices and refusing to pay the full price at other pharmacies.42 Patients, however, dislike 
this kind of limitation, since it might involve travelling long distances to a preferred pharmacy, and 
employers who sponsor private drug plans would rather not face that kind of dissatisfaction, which 
41 See Ontario Drug Benefi t Act - O. Reg. 201/96, Section 8.
42 Appendix 5 describes the use of “Pharmacy Benefi t Managers” in the United States, which enables the exercise of signifi cant 
market power over pharmacies.
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can lead to expensive complaints. The position of employers is particularly constrained when a union 
contract specifi es the characteristics of the drug plan.
 
The Eff ect of Secret Rebates
One power of the ODB Executive Offi cer is to negotiate secret rebates with drug manufacturers. This 
allows the manufacturer to list one price in the formulary and to pay secret rebates based on ODB 
product volume to the province. This is an attractive feature of the system for both brand manufacturers 
and the government, since manufacturers can set high public prices for their products without losing 
sales to the ODB, although these high prices might have repercussions on prices paid by private 
payers, not only in Ontario, but also elsewhere in Canada and even in other countries. In some cases, 
the manufacturer might also be able to obtain supplementary sales. Two interesting examples are the 
products Fosavance and Coversyl. 
Fosavance
Fosavance, made by Merck, is used to treat bone-density loss. It is a fi xed-dose combination pill of 70 
mg of alendronate and 2,800 IU of vitamin D3, and is priced on the ODB list at $9.765 per tablet.
43 In 
turn, alendronate (under the brand name Fosamax) is available generically on the ODB list at $4.425 for 
a 70 mg tablet, while 3,000 IU of vitamin D3 can be purchased for less than $0.25 — thus, the cost of the 
combination of products is approximately $4.675. Clearly, the ODB does not pay $9.765 for each unit of 
Fosavance, but more likely approximately $4.425 after accounting for the rebate, and perhaps even less. 
How does this affect other payers in Ontario? The fact that Fosavance is a benefi t under the ODB (though 
not in other provincial drug insurance programs) makes it easier for physicians to prescribe it widely. 
This, in turn, increases the cost to private insurers, who are paying an extra $5 per pill. It might also 
harm generic manufacturers of alendronate, since their product is not interchangeable with Fosavance. 
(Notably, without generic sales of alendronate, the ODB would not be able to obtain a low price on 
Fosavance.)
Coversyl
Coversyl is an ACE (angiotensin-converting enzyme) inhibitor used to treat hypertension. Recently, the 
8 mg dosage of the drug became generically available in Canada as Apo-perindopril. When the generic 
manufacturer, Apotex, approached the ODB for a listing at a price equal to 85% of the brand-name price, 
the Executive Offi cer refused to list it either as a benefi t or as an interchangeable product, giving as the 
reason that an agreement had been reached between the ODB and Servier, the manufacturer of Coversyl. 
While details of the agreement are not public, it seems likely that Servier is paying a secret rebate to the 
province.44 
The Executive Offi cer controls access to two important lists: the list of drugs that the ODB reimburses, 
and the list of drugs that can be dispensed interchangeably. A product that is interchangeable but not 
reimbursed cannot have any fi nancial implications for the ODB. Thus, while the Executive Offi cer’s 
decision not to list Apo-perindopril as a benefi t would make sense if the net price of Coversyl (after 
confi dential rebates to the province) were below the list price of the generic, the refusal to list the generic 
as an interchangeable product harmed all other payers in the province, none of whom benefi ted from 
secret rebates on Coversyl, without any apparent benefi t to the province. 
43 For ODB drug prices, see Ontario, Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, “Drugs Funded by Ontario Drug Benefi t (ODB) 
Program”; available online at http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/providers/ program/drugs/odbf_eformulary.html.
44 Details of this case are available in Apotex Inc. v. Executive Offi cer for the Ontario Public Drugs Programs and Attorney 
General of Ontario, Ontario Superior Court, Court File 518/07, 8 June 2008. Servier sued Apotex for patent infringement 
and was awarded a decision in its favour in July 2008. Subject to appeal, Apotex will now have to pay damages for all sales 
of the generic, vindicating its decision not to list in Ontario at 50% of the price of the brand-name product. Following further 
litigation, the generic is now listed as interchangeable with the brand-name drug but not as a benefi t.
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To summarize, the province appears to have made an arrangement with one particular fi rm, which has 
had the effect of preventing competition that would benefi t Ontario consumers while starving the fi rm 
that created the competition. In responding to Apotex’s complaint about its treatment, the Executive 
Offi cer noted that she has “broad discretionary powers to list drugs in the Formulary where she is 
satisfi ed that it is in the public interest to do so.”45 Here, however, the defi nition of the public interest 
appears to be restricted to the short-term interests of the Ontario government, since private payers 
were clearly paying higher prices because of the Executive Offi cer’s refusal to list Apo-perindopril as an 
interchangeable product and because, in the long term, even the Ontario government cannot benefi t from 
deterring generic fi rms from challenging patents and thus enabling competition.
Before the implementation of the Transparent Drug System for Patients Act, the ODB, in effect, acted as a 
gatekeeper with respect to drug prices for all Ontario residents — indeed, at that time, drug prices were 
transparent. The effect of the Act has been to allow the Ontario government to reduce the costs of its own 
drug purchases, in part by sacrifi cing private payers to a much less attractive system in which they are 
facing less transparent prices than before.
Moreover, Ontario has constructed the price system very strangely, given its desire to achieve lower costs 
for the province. In many cases, the cost of manufacturing and distributing generic drugs is well below 
even the Ontario generic price. For example, a comparison of the ODB price per pill for several major 
products (omeprazole, amoxicillin, simvastatin) with prices available in the United States reveals that the 
US prices are considerably lower. The effect of the 50% price rule is thus to leave prices far above US 
prices for at least some products, as one would expect from such an arbitrary rule.46 When one compares 
Ontario’s prices and the lowest international prices, the former seem very far out of line — indeed, 
international export prices for some products are a small fraction of the generic price paid by the ODB 
(see Table 2).47 One should be careful in interpreting this comparison, and it indicates nothing about the 
competitiveness of the generic suppliers in Canada, who are providing at the specifi ed price and, on the 
basis of the high prices at which they are selling these products, are offering pharmacies quite substantial 
rebates or “professional allowances.” Indeed, these are products for which many manufacturers hold an 
NOC, so there is no reason to suspect a lack of competition among the manufacturers. What the table 
does indicate is that provincial governments likely could obtain much lower prices for many products.
45 Apotex v. Executive Offi cer, Ontario Superior Court, Court File 518/07, Factum of the Respondents, p. 2.
46 For a recent study comparing Canadian drug prices to US prices, see Skinner and Rovere, Canada’s Drug Price Paradox 
2008. The price comparisons there are for average national prices in Canada with some amalgam of US prices. The data show 
clearly that Canadian generic drug prices tend to be relatively high, especially for some products.
47 One point of caution is that, in Canada, generic drugs are usually sold in the same colour, size, and shape as the original 
branded drug, rather than as a standard round white pill. It is somewhat more expensive to duplicate the unusual shapes of 
branded pills, so it might not be possible for generic manufacturers in Canada to match the lowest international prices.
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Ontario instituted, in late 2008, a tender system to address this failure of the existing mechanism 
to achieve low prices for the ODB system. The tender system is to be used for multi-source generic 
products for which the current generic price in Ontario appears to be far above the actual average costs 
of production. Because the complexity of the tender system introduces many additional considerations, I 
address the mechanism later in this paper, after examining more straightforward tender systems that have 
been implemented in Saskatchewan and British Columbia.
Viewed in the framework of the principles proposed above, the current Ontario system of pricing generic 
drugs fails to satisfy principle 2 (encouraging competition) in cases such as perindopril, where the 
Executive Offi cer inhibits competition. In such cases, the manufacturer of the generic that has invested 
in the patent challenge is not rewarded, and so there is no inducement to create competition through 
eliminating legal barriers to entry. The current Ontario system also fails to ensure that the benefi ts of 
competition are passed on to payers (principle 3) since, for private payers, prices have remained high, 
and even for the ODB, prices are not reduced to levels that refl ect the underlying costs. It also fails to 
satisfy principle 5, since prices vary signifi cantly for different payers, and it fails to satisfy principle 7, 
since both private payers and buyers of generic drugs make a disproportionate contribution to the costs 
of pharmacy. Indeed, the only principles the Ontario scheme seems to satisfy are numbers 1, 4, and 6.
QUEBEC’S RESPONSE: HARD PRICE LIMITS AND LOWEST-PRICE REQUIREMENTS
Quebec modifi ed its generic drug regime with the 2006 Loi sur l’assurance medicaments (Bill 130). Like 
Ontario, Quebec has a bifurcated system with price controls on the products insured by the Régie de 
l’assurance maladie du Québec (RAMQ) and no limits on prices charged to private payers. Quebec also 
has a number of special regulations. 
The 2006 changes limit generic drug reimbursement under the RAMQ to 60% of the innovator drug 
price if there is only one generic product and 54% of that price when there are two or more generic 
competitors. However, in many cases, this law is not binding, since Quebec imposes a “most-favoured-
nation” clause that requires the manufacturer to commit not to charge the RAMQ a higher price than 
t does any other provincial drug insurance program.48 Since the ODB requires prices at 50% of the 
48 According to the Loi sur l’assurance-médicaments, Règlement sur les conditions de reconnaissance d’un fabricant de 
médicaments et d’un grossiste en medicaments, Annexe I, Engagement de fabricants, “Le prix de vente garanti…ne doit pas être 
supérieur à tout prix de vente consenti par le fabricant pour le même médicament en vertu des autres programmes provinciaux 
d’assurance de médicaments” [The price must not be higher than any price granted for the same medicine by the manufacturer 
Table 2: ODB vs. International Pricing, Selected Drugs
Product
ODB Brand 
Reference 
Price
ODB
Generic Price
Number of 
NOCs Granted
Durbin 
Price
Omeprazole 20 mg $2.20 $1.10 5 $0.09
Ciprofl oxacin HCl 250 mg $2.47 $1.11 12 $0.04
Amoxicillin 250 mg n/a $0.17 10 $0.02
Note: The sample here is constrained by the relatively small set of products available through Durbin.
 However, there are competitive suppliers of other generic products with similarly low pricing. The
 Durbin prices are available only for a limited set of medicines, and prices quoted are not
 necessarily for drugs manufactured in facilities approved by Health Canada.
Source:  Durbin PLC; accessed (20/06/08) at http://www.durbin.co.uk/exports.htm.
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reference drug price, the effective price listed for most generic drugs in Quebec is the same as in Ontario. 
Quebec also limits the margin that wholesalers can earn for sales made under the RAMQ, and forbids 
rebates of any sort. As in Ontario, there is a cap of 20% of the drug price for professional allowances; 
unlike in Ontario, this appears to apply to all generic drugs that are included in the basic plan, even for 
private insurers.49
Since the implementation of Bill 130, prices of drugs have been permitted to rise at the rate of infl ation 
annually. (This corresponds to the principle established by section 85 of the Patent Act, which allows 
consideration of the rate of infl ation in the determination of “excessive price” by the PMPRB.) For generic 
drugs, however, no infl ation adjustment can be expected, since Quebec’s most-favoured-nation price 
clause interacts with Ontario’s regulations, which lack any similar infl ation adjustment mechanism. 
The price limits imposed by the RAMQ do not apply to other payers, and prices for private payers in 
Quebec are much higher than those obtained by the RAMQ. Margins and dispensing fees for private 
payers are also unregulated. However, rebates are prohibited, and professional allowances, as mentioned 
above, appear to be restricted to 20%, even for drugs sold to private payers. This combination of rules 
makes Quebec’s generic drug market an outlier in Canadian drug pricing. Prices for private payers are 
extraordinarily high compared with prices elsewhere in Canada for the same drugs, principally due to 
very high mark-ups, which, as Appendix 2 shows, average over 50% for major generic drug products. 
Thus, pharmacies, rather than using rebates or professional allowances, appear to be successfully 
capturing profi ts by charging substantial mark-ups to private payers. (The Quebec market appears to be 
in the process of adjusting to the new rules, so it is likely that these high prices might not be sustained 
over the next few years.)
Quebec has one other special rule that somewhat affects generic sales: it permits RAMQ reimbursement 
of the brand-name medicine at the full price for 15 years following its inclusion in the provincial 
formulary, even if generic competitors have entered during that time. This naturally reduces the sales 
volumes of generics in many cases, so that the proportion of prescriptions fi lled with generic drugs 
in Quebec (42%) is substantially less than in the rest of Canada. (In Alberta, for example, the generic 
proportion is almost 10% higher.)
As in Ontario, generic drug pricing in Quebec fails to ensure that the benefi ts of competition accrue to 
consumers through price reductions. It also allows for very unequal prices between private and public 
payers. The most-favoured-nation clause that requires manufacturers not to grant any other provincial 
drug program a lower price fails to satisfy principle 6 (provincial policies should not be enacted that 
would harm all provinces if replicated).50 This policy has particularly harmed Saskatchewan’s ability to 
obtain low generic drug prices (as we will see in the next section). Arguably, it has also caused British 
Columbia to engage in subterfuge to avoid the effect of this comparison. There are two objections to this 
policy.51 First, it tries to win lower drug prices for Quebec through a process that undermines the ability 
of other provinces to obtain lower drug prices for themselves. Second, if other provinces were to imitate 
Quebec, they, in turn, would reduce Quebec’s ability to obtain lower prices. In the context of drug price 
to other provincial drug insurance programs].
49 Regulation respecting benefi ts authorized for pharmacists, R.Q. c. A-29.01, r.1.01. The regulation requires the pharmacy 
to keep a record of the allowances received, but not of how the allowances were spent, unlike in Ontario. This regulation also 
specifi cally refers only to generic drug manufacturers, not to brand-name manufacturers. Thus, a brand-name manufacturer 
facing generic competition could offer larger professional allowances than its generic competitors.
50 For further commentary on this issue, see Canada, Competition Bureau, Benefi ting from Generic Drug Competition in 
Canada: The Way Forward.
51 The Patent Act (S. 85(1)(c)) also explicitly endorses a comparison with other countries in determining whether a drug 
price is excessive.
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negotiation, the bargaining power of provincial drug insurance plans to obtain price reductions is based 
on the threat that, if no reduction is granted, the drug will not be listed. If all provinces were to imitate 
Quebec, the costs to the manufacturer of lowering the price in one province to obtain a listing would be 
amplifi ed, since it would then have to lower the price in all provinces. In effect, Quebec’s policy weakens 
the bargaining power of each province since the threat of not listing in one province cannot possibly 
induce the manufacturer to lower the price there, since it would have to match the price drop in all 
provinces.
 
SASKATCHEWAN’S RESPONSE: “STANDING OFFER CONTRACTS”
Saskatchewan, unlike Ontario and Quebec, has a one-tier system in which the price for the province is the 
same as the price for other payers.52 The province’s public insurance system is universal in the sense that 
all residents are eligible for coverage under the provincial plan once they have reached a deductible for the 
year.
Saskatchewan is unique in Canada in that, for many years, it has used a system of “standing offer 
contracts” (SOCs) for some generic drugs. Under the SOCs, the government seeks tenders for a single 
fi rm to supply the entire province for a fi xed period of time at the price specifi ed in the tender. In 
return, the manufacturer’s product is used exclusively, except by individuals who have a medical need 
for an alternative product or if the manufacturer is unable to meet the demand. Only the drug of the 
fi rm that wins the contract can be used to fi ll a prescription in an interchangeable group with an SOC. 
If a prescription is written as “no substitution” for any brand other than the winning fi rm, provincial 
insurance will cover the actual acquisition cost up to the listed unit price of the winning fi rm. Any excess 
is the responsibility of the consumer. 
An important part of the SOC mechanism is that manufacturers that participate in these tenders are 
not required to pay any rebates to the pharmacies and, therefore, are better able to offer low prices. The 
SOC mechanism thus provides meaningful savings to the Saskatchewan government and to consumers, 
estimated to be approximately $13 million in fi scal year 2006/07.53 There are currently 46 molecules in 
the SOC mechanism in Saskatchewan. Appendix 4 lists and compares the prices of all products for which 
there was an exact match in the Ontario formulary; for most products, the Saskatchewan SOC price is 
slightly less than the ODB price — on average, the price in Saskatchewan is 92% of the Ontario price.54 
After accounting for different mark-ups and dispensing fees, however, the savings to the Saskatchewan 
government are rather small. In Ontario, the maximum dispensing fee is $7 per prescription and the 
mark-up is 8% on all products; in Saskatchewan, the dispensing fee is $8.63, while the mark-up averages 
over 10% for generic drugs.55 Thus, in Ontario, for a drug with a wholesale price of $25, the total price 
paid to the pharmacy would be $34, including mark-up and dispensing fee. In Saskatchewan, if the drug’s 
wholesale price were 92% of the Ontario price, it would be $23; adding the mark-up and dispensing fee, 
the total amount paid to the pharmacy would be $33.93, a cost savings of 7 cents. The higher mark-up 
and dispensing fee paid in Saskatchewan might in part compensate pharmacies for the fact that, under 
SOCs, they receive no rebates or professional allowances from generic manufacturers.
52 Notably, the Prescription Drugs Act (s. 5(d)) specifi cally authorizes the Minister of Health to determine “the amount that 
may be charged to a resident for the purchase of a drug dispensed in the pharmacy if such drug is listed in the formulary,” 
quite separately from the Minister’s authority to determine the amount paid by the government for insured drugs.
53 See Saskatchewan, Ministry of Health, Drug Plan and Extended Benefi ts Branch, “About the Saskatchewan Formulary” 
(Regina); accessed online (26/05/08) at http://formulary.drugplan.health.gov. sk.ca/.
54 This percentage is only an average of the prices, and does not account for volume.
55 In Saskatchewan, the maximum mark-up allowance calculated on the prescription drug cost is 30% for drug costs up to 
$6.30, 15% for drug costs between $6.31 and $15.80, 10% for drug costs between $15.81 and $200.00, and a maximum of 
$20.00 for drug costs over $200.00. Prescriptions fi lled with generic drugs rarely exceed $200.
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Private payers clearly benefi t from the SOC mechanism. As Appendix 2 shows, for private payers, the 
average price of drugs for which Saskatchewan used an SOC was considerably below that in other 
provinces. In contrast, private payer prices in Saskatchewan tend to be high for other products.
One limitation on the effectiveness of the SOC mechanism is that the aggressiveness with which 
most generic manufacturers can compete for an SOC is hindered by the Quebec interprovincial price 
comparison. The costs of supplying an SOC in Saskatchewan are relatively low, so one should expect low 
prices. In the SOC mechanism, the manufacturer deals with two wholesalers and pays no professional 
allowances, and payment is guaranteed within 30 days. In contrast, in Quebec, sales are made either 
directly to pharmacies or through a wholesaler, without any guarantee of payment and often with a 
prompt discount of 2% for payment made within 30 days. When sales in Quebec are made through 
a wholesaler, the wholesaler typically requires a margin of between 5% and 7.5%.56 In addition, the 
Quebec government allows professional allowances of up to 20% of the price of the product, which are 
not paid in Saskatchewan for SOC drugs. Thus, since the costs of doing business as the sole supplier 
are considerably less in Saskatchewan than as one of many competing manufacturers in Quebec, the 
comparison between Saskatchewan and Quebec prices is not only unfair, but is harmful to the ability of 
generic fi rms to drop their Saskatchewan prices as much as is justifi ed by the cost differences. 
Thus, fi rms that wish to bid aggressively on the Saskatchewan SOCs are effectively inhibited from 
participating in Quebec, where they cannot profi tably sell at the same price. Generic manufacturers have 
tried to evade this problem by selling to the SOC through small generic fi rms, which, of course, increases 
costs without any accompanying social benefi ts.57 As a result, only two generic fi rms actively participate 
in the Saskatchewan SOCs: Nu-Pharm and Dominion. Thus, competition in Saskatchewan is likely to 
be less aggressive than one would expect if there were more fi rms bidding on the SOCs. It also explains 
why the prices in the Saskatchewan SOC are not particularly favourable for the province, and the lack of 
participants renders the continuing viability of the SOC system somewhat questionable.
There are two further objections to the SOC system. First, since the SOC mechanism leads to only one 
particular drug being available in each interchangeable group, this can be problematic for consumers 
who respond better to a different drug in the interchangeable group. Such differences might be rare, 
and the SOC mechanism does allow for “no substitution” prescriptions, but even then, the patient 
might have diffi culty obtaining a drug that is not sold anywhere in the province. For pharmacies, the 
SOC mechanism could be problematic if the sole supplier is unable to provide the drug in suffi cient 
quantities to meet demand — one advantage of a system with many suppliers is that if one fi rm faces 
a manufacturing or distribution problem, others can fi ll the gap. (Again, however, this problem could 
be addressed simply by purchasing from other manufacturers in such cases.) This suggests that the 
SOC mechanism is slightly less attractive than other mechanisms with respect to ensuring stability and 
security of supply.
The second objection to the SOC mechanism is that it might lead to reduced competition, for two 
reasons. First, it might reduce the number of fi rms actively engaged in producing a given drug, which, 
in turn, could reduce their interest in participating in the SOC process in the future on a given drug. 
Second, it might weaken somewhat the benefi t of generic litigation, since, by giving no preference to early 
entrants, the process lessens the advantage to the fi rm of being the fi rst to enter the market.58
56 For a summary of these differences, see Nu-Pharm inc. c. Québec (Ministre de la Santé et des Services sociaux), R.J.Q. 2478, 
36 Admin. L.R. (3d) 256, REJB 2000-20194, J.E. 2000-1857.
57 See Chiles, Letter to the PMPRB, 9 May 2005.
58 See Aidan Hollis, “The Importance of Being First: Evidence from Canadian Generic Pharmaceuticals,” Health Economics 
11(8, 2002): 723-734.
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With respect to the other principles outlined earlier, however, the SOC process appears to work well. 
Could Saskatchewan’s approach work for Alberta? There are a few points to note. First, tendering appears 
to be less well suited for some products than for others. For example, it does not appear to be suitable 
when there are only a few players in the market, since they have weak incentives to undercut each 
other; the system is likely to be more effective when there are many competing manufacturers. Thus, 
tendering should be used only on a case-by-case basis, and the province still needs to have an alternative 
mechanism that would apply, at least initially, to every generic product. Tendering, in other words, might 
be useful in some situations, but it can only be supplementary to some other approach.
Second, tendering creates a situation in which, at the end of the tender period, all patients could 
be required switch to some alternative, resulting in confusion and inconvenience for some and, in 
exceptional cases, others might not derive any benefi t from the new product.
Third, as discussed above, tendering might signifi cantly harm the benefi t from being the fi rst generic and 
thus harm the incentive to challenge patents. 
Fourth, because tendering leaves no room for unsuccessful bidders to supply the drug, in time those 
fi rms might become less competitive manufacturers of the product. In turn, this reduces competition, 
leaving the successful tenders themselves less able to achieve their goal of low prices.
Finally, tendering seems likely to achieve only limited price reductions when a single list price applies to 
all buyers, because of the Quebec price comparison.
 
BRITISH COLUMBIA’S RESPONSE: TENDERING WITH SECRET REBATES
British Columbia’s drug-pricing system resembles Saskatchewan’s in that prices tend to be the same for 
private and public payers. British Columbia also has introduced some innovations that affect generic drug 
pricing — namely, reference drug pricing and tendering with secret rebates.
British Columbia uses reference pricing for a number of groups of drugs, such as proton pump inhibitors 
and ACE inhibitors. In each class, the Ministry of Health has classifi ed certain products to be subject 
to a maximum price, determined by the price of a reference drug within that class. The provincial drug 
insurance plan, PharmaCare, will pay only up to the maximum price, and patients are responsible for any 
excess. This policy applies to both generic and brand-name products, and clearly has the largest effect 
on the latter. Reference pricing does not imply substitution at the pharmacy, and, in effect, is a way of 
controlling costs.
British Columbia has also experimented with tendering.59 Saskatchewan’s diffi culties with its tendering 
process because of Quebec’s interprovincial price comparison test are well known. In response, British 
Columbia has instituted a sole-sourcing arrangement for a generically available drug in which a single 
fi rm is contracted to be the only supplier for the province of a drug listed as a benefi t under PharmaCare. 
This single supplier may charge a high price, but must pay a rebate to PharmaCare for every sale made of 
a drug that PharmaCare fully or partly insures. The rebate amount is confi dential under the agreement, 
which avoids the problem of the Quebec inter-provincial comparison creating a fl oor price.
59 This section draws heavily from Aidan Hollis, “The Use of Secret Rebates by Provincial Drug Insurance Agencies: What 
Impact on Patients?” IAPR Policy Brief 08001 (Calgary: University of Calgary, Institute for Advanced Policy Research); available 
at http://www.iapr.ca/fi les/iapr/iapr-pb-08001.pdf.
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British Columbia’s sole-sourcing mechanism is now in use for one product, olanzapine, that is generically 
available everywhere in Canada except British Columbia, where only the brand-name product Zyprexa, 
made by Eli Lilly, is widely available. British Columbia’s approach results in substantially higher prices 
for consumers whose purchases are not 100% insured by PharmaCare.
Novopharm, a generic drug manufacturer, challenged Lilly’s patents on the grounds of invalidity under 
the NOC regulations. Lilly abandoned one infringement claim and a second patent was declared invalid, 
and Health Canada granted Novopharm an NOC to sell Novo-olanzapine, a generic form of the drug 
(Pharmascience has also received an NOC for its generic, PMS-olanzapine). Other provinces have listed 
Novo-olanzapine in their formularies at substantial discounts to Zyprexa.
In December 2007, the BC government issued a “Request for Proposals,” offering fi rms the right to be 
the sole supplier of olanzapine to be listed in the provincial formulary. The contract does not bar other 
manufacturers from selling olanzapine in British Columbia provided they have obtained an NOC from 
Health Canada. In practice, however, it means that no competing fi rm can make meaningful sales of 
olanzapine since consumers whose purchases of the drug are insured by PharmaCare certainly will prefer 
to buy the sole-sourced item rather than a form of the drug that PharmaCare does not cover. Similarly, 
consumers whose purchases are covered by private insurance will prefer the sole-sourced product if 
their insurer’s formulary is aligned with that of PharmaCare,60 while uninsured consumers will prefer 
to purchase the sole-source olanzapine since that brings them closer to their deductible limit.61 In these 
circumstances, since demand for competitive, lower-priced olanzapine is so small, most pharmacies are 
unlikely to stock it.
In their proposal, fi rms had to include two prices: a list price at which the drug would be listed and 
sold to consumers, and a confi dential “cost recovery amount” or rebate that the fi rm would pay to the 
province for each pill insured in whole or in part by PharmaCare. Thus, the criterion for a successful 
proposal was not the price paid by the consumer, but the net price paid by PharmaCare.62 In these 
circumstances, the obvious strategy for the winning fi rm is to charge a very high list price and offer a 
large rebate to PharmaCare.
The Eff ect of Sole Sourcing on Prices and Consumer Welfare
PharmaCare defends its sole-sourcing strategy on the basis that “the province is acting in the public 
interest to achieve the lowest drug prices possible for the people of British Columbia.” Yet, as the 
comparison in Table 3 of current wholesale prices of olanzapine in British Columbia and Alberta 3 
shows, BC consumers whose purchases of olanzapine are not 100% covered by PharmaCare (or by 
private insurance) pay 63% more than they would in the absence of the sole-sourcing agreement. These 
data suggest that PharmaCare is receiving a secret rebate suffi ciently large to lower the net price of 
insured olanzapine below the generic price available in the rest of Canada. Moreover, PharmaCare is able 
to obtain this low price only by allowing the manufacturer to charge more for olanzapine purchased by 
consumers who are not fully insured by PharmaCare.
60 Some employers allow a more comprehensive formulary that includes products not in the PharmaCare formulary. While 
the employers would prefer the insured to purchase the drug listed as a benefi t, in order to bring the insured person closer to 
the PharmaCare deductible limit, it is possible that pharmacies might prefer to dispense a competitive generic product with a 
substantial rebate.
61 A drug that is not a benefi t does not count as an eligible expense, a point confi rmed by the author in a telephone call to the 
PharmaCare help desk, 15 May 2008.
62 The “Request for Proposals” specifi cally states that the list price will be relevant in determining the winner only if the net 
prices offered by two fi rms are identical.
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It is apparent why PharmaCare fi nds this an attractive solution: it is able to obtain a low price on all sales 
that are 100% insured. And on sales that are partially insured, PharmaCare’s savings are even larger, 
because the co-payment made by the consumer is a fraction of the high list price. The effect on patients, 
private insurers, PharmaCare, and sellers is illustrated in Table 4, which assumes a secret rebate of $3.00 
per 10 mg tablet. As the table shows, for patients whose drugs are covered by PharmaCare (at least in 
part), the total price paid to the seller may in fact be lower than with competitive sales; however, the seller 
is compensated by being able to charge higher prices for purchases that are not covered by PharmaCare. 
So, while PharmaCare’s costs are reduced, British Columbia residents, whether they are covered or not, 
end up paying more for their drugs when they are sick.
 
Table 3: Prices for Olanzapine, British Columbia and Alberta 
Dosage
British 
Columbia
Alberta Price Difference
($) (%)
2.5 mg 1.92 1.18 63
5 mg 3.85 2.36 63
7.5 mg 5.77 3.54 63
10 mg 7.69 4.73 63
15 mg 11.54 7.09 63
Source: All fi gures are drawn from the British Columbia and Alberta formularies as of November 2008.
Table 4: The Effect of Secret Rebates on Payers
Private Insurance
or No Insurance
Insured by PharmaCare
with Co-payment
Competitive Market Sole Sourcing Competitive Market Sole Sourcing
Price for 10 mg tablet $4.73 $7.69 $4.73 $7.69
PharmaCare 
contribution $0.00 $0.00 $3.31 $5.38
Assumed secret rebate $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $3.00
Net cost to PharmaCare $0.00 $0.00 $3.31 $2.38
Net cost to patient $4.73 $7.69 $1.42 $2.31
Revenue of seller $4.73 $7.69 $4.73 $4.69
Note: The table assumes a secret rebate of $3.00 to PharmaCare. Prices are as listed in the formulary and do
not include mark-ups or dispensing fees. In the case of partial insurance by PharmaCare, sole sourcing with secret 
rebate means that patients pay a co-payment based on the nominal, not the real, price.
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It is even possible for the rebate to PharmaCare to be larger than the amount that it pays, so that 
PharmaCare could make profi ts from “insuring” certain drugs. For example, suppose in the above 
example that the rebate to PharmaCare was $5.50 per 10 mg tablet. The seller could be willing to pay a 
large rebate if it received the right to charge a high price on all purchases, including those not covered by 
PharmaCare. In this case, PharmaCare’s contribution to the cost of the drug would be only $5.38, so for 
every pill consumed, PharmaCare would make a profi t of $0.12.
 
An EvaluaƟ on of Tendering with Secret Rebates
The sole-sourcing approach with secret rebates is problematic in a number of ways. First, it obviously fails 
to satisfy principle 5 — that of having the same prices for all payers in the province. In fact, it fails this 
principle in an extreme way because it obtains low prices for the province in part by enabling high prices 
for other payers.
Second, it fails to satisfy principle 3 — that the benefi ts of competition should accrue to payers, since at 
least some payers are denied these benefi ts.
Third, it fails to satisfy principle 2 — that of encouraging competition. Normally, the fi rm with lower 
costs will win the tender contract. Certainly, that would be a desirable outcome from the perspective 
of effi ciency. The fi rm with a tender that includes secret rebates, however, distorts the outcome, so that 
what matters is not so much how low the fi rm’s costs are but how high a list price the fi rm can charge. 
This is so since the fi rm can, in effect, subsidize its low net price by charging a high list price. Indeed, 
Lilly increased the list price of Zyprexa following the BC “Request for Proposals.” Had Novopharm tried 
to charge such a high list price for its generic, it likely would have found it hard to make signifi cant 
sales to privately insured or cash-paying customers, since private insurance likely would have continued 
to permit reimbursement for the brand-name product Zyprexa.63 In other words, the mechanism of 
tendering with secret rebates favours the brand-name product because of the expectations of pricing 
for generics and brand-name products and the willingness of private insurers to reimburse brand-name 
products.64
 
The disabling effect of tenders with secret rebates on competition also extends to the incentives 
for generic fi rms to challenge patents. In the case of olanzapine, Novopharm lost any advantage in 
British Columbia from being the fi rst generic manufacturer to obtain an NOC for the drug since other 
manufacturers of the generic, such as Pharmascience, have now also obtained, or are in the process of 
obtaining, NOCs. Thus, by the time the British Columbia government issues its next tender contract 
for olanzapine or opens up this market to ordinary competition, Novopharm will have no advantage 
over other generic manufacturers. Novopharm will have made a considerable investment in litigation 
and product development and BC PharmaCare will have obtained lower net prices because of it — but 
Novopharm will benefi t not at all. This is not a recipe for encouraging generic fi rms to challenge patents 
they believe might be found invalid in court.
Tendering with secret rebates also fails to satisfy principle 7 — fair compensation of pharmacies by all 
payers — since the British Columbia government is essentially appropriating the rebates that normally 
would have been paid to pharmacies; the costs of pharmacy are therefore shifted onto the buyers of other 
drugs.
Hard Price Limits
Since the beginning of 2009, British Columbia has matched Ontario’s pricing maximum by reimbursing 
63 Pharmacies, on the other hand, might have preferred to dispense a generic product that carried a substantial rebate.
64 Another obstacle generic companies face in competing for these contracts is that pharmacies might demand their normal 
rebates based on sales of the product; these rebates are not normally paid by brand companies.
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multisource generic drugs paid for under PharmaCare at a rate not exceeding 50% of the brand-name 
product price.65 It is not yet clear exactly how this new approach will work — multisource generic drugs 
continue to be listed in the formulary at the old prices, implying that private insurers will now pay higher 
prices than the province.
 
ONTARIO’S NEW TENDERING PROPOSAL
Ontario, recognizing that the public drug plan was still paying prices well above the cost of manufacture 
for at least some generic drugs, has recently introduced a tender system. It resembles that of British 
Columbia in that Ontario receives secret rebates or volume discounts on all sales insured by the province; 
however, the formulary list price remains at 50% of the brand-name price. To enhance security and 
stability of supply, the original plan was for the tender to be awarded to two fi rms that would then have 
to compete for public sector sales, presumably by paying allowances to pharmacies on their private 
sector sales. The system includes many innovative features that have yet to be tested, and it is too soon to 
evaluate how successful it will be in achieving signifi cantly lower net prices for the province.
The tender initially was proposed for four products, but for reasons the province has not disclosed, only 
one drug, enalapril maleate, has been included in the system and the sole winner of the tender was the 
brand manufacturer, Merck.
Nevertheless, the tender system seems likely to create various problems. First, it essentially is designed 
to reduce the price paid by the public drug plan, while leaving the private sector — employers and 
the uninsured — paying the same high prices. This would simply reduce the amount of the rebates 
pharmacies collect on their private sector sales, as fi rms that win the tender would have to pay secret 
rebates to the province.66 Since the pharmacy service delivered in the public and private sectors is the 
same and the net price at which the pharmacy buys the product to supply the public and private sectors 
is the same, the tender system would have the effect of reducing the total amount of rebates pharmacies 
collect. In addition, private payers, rather than the province, would bear an increasing share of the costs 
of pharmacy. If the Government of Ontario deserves to benefi t from low prices, why should residents of 
the province not obtain the same benefi t?
A second problem with the proposed tender system is that it is likely to lead to a redistribution of 
revenues from existing incumbent manufacturers — which have made a substantial investment in 
early market entry and the development of relationships with pharmacies — to generic fi rms with no 
manufacturing facilities in Canada or to brand-name multinationals like Merck. This could lead to 
the loss of manufacturing jobs in Canada, with no obvious effi ciency rationale. The net revenues of 
manufacturers fall only if there are substantial economies of scale beyond those already realized — which 
seems unlikely, given the global nature of the business — but, under the proposed system, revenues would 
be allocated differently among manufacturers, with those that have had a large share of ODB sales in the 
past likely to lose share to others.
A third problem is that the proposed mechanism would make it more profi table for pharmacists 
to dispense medicines that do not win the tender to patients who have both ODB insurance and 
65 See British Columbia, Ministry of Health Services, News Release, 12 December 2008; accessed online (11/01/09) at http://
www2.news.gov.bc.ca:80/news_releases_2005-2009/2008HSERV0117-001892.htm.
66 At present, when a generic fi rm pays a large allowance to the pharmacy, it obtains both private and public sales. The public 
sales have a rebate of 20% on a price equal to 50% of the brand-name price — that is, the generic receives a net price of 40% 
of the brand-name price on all sales under the public system. Given a cost of supply below that level — say, 25% of the brand-
name price — the generic must pay a very large allowance on private sales in order to obtain those profi table public sector 
sales. When the margin on public sector sales falls, the willingness to pay large private sector allowances also diminishes.
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supplementary private insurance. This could result in the shifting onto private payers of a substantial 
fraction of prescriptions for which the ODB would normally pay.
Finally, because Ontario’s proposed tender system, like those in Saskatchewan and British Columbia, 
would eliminate any benefi t of early entry by fi rms that have invested in patent challenges, it is likely to 
reduce such investment and lengthen the arrival of competition from other generics, ultimately resulting 
in higher prices for all payers.
Ontario’s proposed tender system, in other words, would continue to violate the same principles as does 
the existing system. It would certainly fail to satisfy principle 7 — fair compensation of pharmacies by 
all payers — since private payers would end up paying an even greater share of the costs of pharmacy. It 
would also fail to satisfy principle 2 to an even greater extent by very substantially reducing the incentive 
to challenge patents and to enable generic competition.
AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE BY ALBERTA
In this paper, I have argued that Alberta should reconsider its methods of drug pricing and/or procurement 
to obtain lower prices, and I have reviewed the mechanisms four provinces have advanced to reduce the 
costs of their generic drug purchases and identifi ed the strengths and weaknesses of each. Should Alberta 
adopt one of these mechanisms directly or with some appropriate modifi cations?
Any solution should deal with the two key problems of a lack of incentive for fi rms to challenge 
patents that are invalid or not infringed by competition, and the failure of competition from generic 
manufacturers to result in low prices for payers.67 It would also be desirable to construct a solution that 
could be exported to other provinces: if more provinces had similar approaches, it would enable a more 
coherent national strategy with respect to generic drugs.
Saskatchewan’s relatively successful use of the SOC process suggests that tendering (without secret 
rebates) is worthy of serious consideration. As I noted earlier, however, while tendering can be used 
successfully in cases where there are enough generic competitors, it is not likely to be desirable 
immediately upon the entry of a generic; in such a case, it would probably fail to generate low prices, 
and might well fail to provide any reward to a generic competitor that eliminated barriers to competition. 
Therefore, tendering should be used in association with another mechanism, which I describe below, 
in cases where it is inappropriate (such as in the initial period of generic competition, and for specifi c 
products for which tendering would be undesirable). Later, I discuss how tendering might operate in 
tandem with the mechanism I propose. 
The core features of my proposal are: a descending maximum price; infl ation indexing; a cap on rebates 
or other consideration granted to pharmacies by manufacturers directly or indirectly; an open formulary; 
and a “royalty” paid to the fi rst generic entrant that has shown patent invalidity or developed a non-
infringing alternative.
 
A Descending Maximum Price
In Ontario, the old regulations allowed for a maximum generic price equal to 70% of the brand-name 
price when only one generic was available. With two or more generics, the price fell to 63% of the brand-
name price. Quebec now employs the same kind of rule. Ontario now caps the generic price at 50% 
67 One might, of course, question whether Alberta should bother trying to create incentives for entry by generic 
manufacturers. Given its relatively small size, Alberta’s impact on such incentives also must be relatively small, which makes 
free riding attractive. There might be scope for a larger impact if the western provinces could band together to form a common 
policy.
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when there are two or more generic manufacturers, but when there is only one, the price in some cases 
might be higher. This approach clearly leaves gains available, since the cost of many generic drugs is well 
below 50% that of the brand-name drug. There is thus no reason not to require further price reductions 
if more fi rms are willing to enter at increasingly lower prices. Therefore, I propose a price schedule that 
becomes lower as more generic manufacturers enter (see Table 5).
Table 5: Proposed Maximum Price Schedule
Generic Manufacturers Maximum Price
(number) (%)
1 75
2 55
3 45
4 40
5 35
6 30
7 25
The maximum price any payer in the province, public or private, would pay would be calculated as a 
fraction of the average price of the patented reference drug during the two years prior to entry. If more 
than six manufacturers entered, the price could continue to drop, perhaps by increments of 2% per 
additional manufacturer. The lower price would apply to all manufacturers.68 
This approach has three chief benefi ts. First, the price would continue to fall as long as costs were lower 
than the price. In normal competitive markets, there is no need for such a mechanism because consumers 
hunt for lower prices. With insurers bearing most of the costs, however, consumers are insulated from 
real prices and lack an incentive to search for lower prices, which is particularly problematic when 
many consumers do not bear any of the cost and many are not in good health at the time of purchase.69 
Requiring the price to decline as more fi rms enter the market would have the effect of revealing the 
true costs of generic manufacturing, since additional fi rms would enter only if the price was above their 
expected costs of serving the market.70 
The second chief benefi t is that lower-cost producers would have an advantage in this kind of 
marketplace, since, as additional fi rms enter, the price would be driven down, forcing higher-cost 
producers out of the market, leading to greater productive effi ciency.
The third chief benefi t is that early entrants would have a signifi cant market advantage, since later 
entrants likely would obtain relatively small market shares unless they could induce some early entrants 
68 These proposed prices have not been carefully calibrated; the important point is to outline the appropriate mechanism 
rather than specifi c prices. In fact, however, one advantage of this mechanism is that prices would not need to be perfectly 
calibrated: the price would be driven down automatically only if new entrants believed that the price would be higher than 
their costs. Thus, this system is a cost-revelation mechanism.
69 This point is troubling because of the position of trust the pharmacist holds with respect to the patient, who may not be in 
a position to bargain over price.
70 Note that the relevant costs may be either marginal or average. If there is a worldwide market for a particular product, a 
generic manufacturer might need only to obtain a price greater than the marginal cost of production to make it worthwhile to 
enter. If the market is Canada, a fi rm might require a price that is at least equal to its average costs to enter.
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to drop out of the market. This is attractive since early entrants would be the ones to eliminate barriers to 
competition.
Some important details of the proposal should be noted. A fi rm that competed in this system would have 
to be willing to supply as much as the market demanded in order to have its product accepted in the 
provincial formulary at the new price (as Ontario now requires). The reason this is important is that each 
time a new fi rm entered the market, it would drive the price down and might lead other fi rms to exit. 
Failure to meet demand at that price would require the province to step in and buy from higher-priced 
sellers. The entrant would be responsible for making up the supplementary cost to the province for at 
least one year following entry.
For example, suppose that there were two generics in a given market, with the generic reimbursement 
price equal to 55%, and a third generic then decided to enter and committed to fi ll demand at 45%. In 
such a scenario, it is highly probable that the fi rst two fi rms would stay in the market at the new lower 
price while new entrant obtained some share of the market. If the fi rst two fi rms refused to reduce their 
prices, however, the new entrant would obtain the entire market at its lower price. If the new entrant 
subsequently was unable to meet demand, the province would solicit bids for additional supply, with any 
cost above 45% to be reimbursed by the entrant. 
A declining price schedule would require some adjustments with respect to stock that was acquired 
before the reimbursable price fell. I suggest the following two rules for dealing with this issue. First, 
all future sales would have to be at the new price, starting on the new fi rm’s date of entry. Second, all 
previous purchases by pharmacies could be reimbursed at the actual invoiced higher price, provided that 
the product was submitted for reimbursement within 30 days; any product sold to patients more than 30 
days following the entry date would be reimbursed at the new price. The motivation for the second rule 
is that the pharmacy’s rebate would be larger if it were based on the older price, in which case both the 
pharmacy and the manufacturer would have an incentive to overstock at high prices. 
The effect of these rules on the costs to the province would be substantial. For many of the most 
important generic drugs with multiple entrants, prices would be about half the levels achieved under the 
current system, assuming the same number of entrants (see Appendix 6). It should be noted, however, 
that the mechanism is fl exible in that it would encourage entry only if the price remained above the cost 
of supply.
Infl aƟ on Indexing
Although, under the proposed scheme, prices would be forced down by competition, prices should also 
refl ect costs. This implies that maximum prices should be adjusted every year by the rate of infl ation, a rule 
that is applied by both Quebec and the PMPRB.71 This kind of indexing would be fair to the manufacturers, 
and would discourage outcomes in which manufacturers are forced out, not by competition but by artifi cially 
low prices.
It is possible that, even with indexing, costs for certain drug products might rise above the maximum 
price, leading to a lack of adequate supplies. In such a case, it would be appropriate for the provincial 
government to use an SOC mechanism to reveal the true costs of serving the market.72
71 See Canada, Patented Medicine Prices Review Board, Compendium of Guidelines, Policies and Procedures, Schedule 
4 — CPI Adjustment Methodology (Ottawa); accessed (20/06/08) at http://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca/english/view.
asp?x=1034&mid=808#guid.
72 The mechanism proposed here would be effective in determining whether the true costs of serving a market were below the 
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A Limit on Rebates to Pharmacies
Historically, in Alberta as in most other provinces, pharmacies have earned substantial profi ts from 
rebates by manufacturers of generic drugs.73 Industry sources suggest that the average level of rebates is 
approximately 50% nationally — thus, for a drug for which the pharmacy is reimbursed $1.00 plus mark-
up and dispensing fee, the average wholesale acquisition cost is only $0.50. These substantial rebates 
explain why retail prices for generic drugs in Canada are high. A descending price scale would squeeze 
those rebates, but if pharmacies continued to demand high rebates, generic manufacturers would obtain 
less profi t and be less willing to enter the market. And without additional entrants, prices would not 
decrease.74
Thus, rebates to pharmacies should be limited to approximately 10% of the price of the drug being sold,75 
with pharmacies perhaps compensated in a more transparent fashion through regulated mark-ups and 
dispensing fees. Quebec and Ontario already prohibit rebates and limit professional allowances to 20% of 
the price. The distinction between rebates and professional allowances seems to imply that a regulatory 
body would verify that the pharmacy was using the allowances for an eligible purpose, which would be 
extremely diffi cult to ascertain since money is fungible. It might be easier simply to allow limited rebates 
without any such restriction.
In Ontario, unlimited allowances may be paid on sales to the private sector, and the restriction on 
allowances applies only to sales to the public sector. This approach appears not to have been successful, 
since competition for pharmacies’ business now focuses on the amount of allowances paid on drugs sold 
outside the public sector. The result is that pharmacies are still able to extract approximately the same 
total discount from manufacturers.
In Quebec, the limit on professional allowances, combined with prices that are still relatively high, means 
that the spread between costs and prices is also large. This approach either leaves substantial profi ts 
with manufacturers or, more likely, draws in additional manufacturers that seek a share of the market. 
The pricing mechanism means, however, that despite the presence of many manufacturers, prices are 
not falling and, arguably, the purpose of competition is defeated. Despite Quebec’s limits on rebates, the 
profi ts that would be attributable to manufacturers are apt to be used up by competition for a share of 
the market.76 At present, large generic rebates are an essential part of the pharmacy business model, and 
without them pharmacies might not be able to provide the same level of service. This means, of course, 
that, if rebates were reduced, the permitted mark-up and dispensing fees would have to be increased, 
ased on evidence on costs and a suitable profi t margin.77 
current price — entry would reveal this. However, my proposal contains no mechanism for prices to be adjusted upward except 
through infl ation adjustment. If costs rose above prices, all fi rms might drop out of the market, in which case a tender would 
be a reasonable way to determine the lowest available price.
73 Typically, manufacturers of brand-name drugs do not offer rebates as they are not competing for space in the pharmacy, 
although rebates on brand-name products could become more common as fi rms participate in tenders such as the proposed 
Ontario system.
74 One possible consideration is to allow a new entrant to give a rebate of, say, 12% for a limited time such as a month, to 
encourage take-up of the entrant’s product.
75 Indeed, for many years, Quebec has not permitted rebates at all, although, as we have seen, Quebec pharmacies obtained 
supplementary revenues through large mark-ups charged to private payers. There are also allegations that rebates were paid 
despite the regulations. See, for example, Québec (Régie de l’Assurance-maladie) c. Pharmascience inc., 2004 CanLII 4667 (QC 
C.S.); see also fi les of the Cour Supérieure du Québec, 500-17-015571-030, 500-17-015460-036, and 500-17-015406-039.
76 In these circumstances, manufacturers engage in costly activities designed to boost market share by providing some 
“reward” for the pharmacy.
77 Of interest in this respect is a recent study that examines the costs of retail pharmacies in British Columbia; see A.T. 
Kearney, Activity Based Costing Study Final Report: Study Findings and Analysis (Vancouver, January 2007); accessed online 
(20/06/08) at http://www.health.gov.bc.ca/pharme/ ABC_Report_2007.pdf.
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Since manufacturers and pharmacy chains operate on a national level, Alberta should lobby other 
provinces that permit rebates to limit them to avoid their use to infl uence purchasing decisions on a 
national level. Within Alberta, both the giving and receiving of excessive rebates should be penalized, 
with the penalty for the recipient being not only the loss of the amount received, but also an additional 
amount equal to some multiple of the excess. The manufacturer granting the excessive rebate should 
face a similar penalty.78 An excessive rebate resembles a conspiracy between two fi rms: the manufacturer, 
which wants to get its product into the pharmacy at the expense of other manufacturers, and the 
pharmacy, which arranges this in exchange for a payment (rebate) from the manufacturer.79 At the federal 
level, the Competition Bureau has been very successful in achieving convictions under the Competition 
Act after granting immunity to conspirators who offer information on the conspiracy to the Bureau, since 
such evidence helps to obtain a conviction of the party that did not confess and makes conspiracies 
more likely to be detected.80 It would be sensible to use a similar system in the case of excessive rebates, 
allowing fi rms that admit to receiving or granting them to be awarded immunity. As an additional 
mechanism to reduce their use, whistleblowers could be awarded a share of any rebate detected. 
Ultimately, of course, the goal is not to detect excessive rebates but to prevent them from occurring, by 
making detection more likely.
It is important to note that a limitation on rebates is, in fact, a way of satisfying principle 7 — that 
pharmacies should be fairly compensated by all payers — since it is not fair if large rebates are paid on 
only some drugs but not others, which discriminates against patients using the high-rebate drugs. Of 
course, limiting rebates would mean that pharmacies would have to be paid more generous mark-ups 
and/or dispensing fees or otherwise compensated based on the provision of supplementary professional 
pharmacy services.
An Open Formulary
Since prices fall when new fi rms enter any given market, it would be in the interests of the province not 
to restrict the entry of generic drugs beyond requiring entrants to have an NOC from Health Canada 
and to supply as much of the drugs as needed at the specifi ed price (assuming that they are truly 
interchangeable).81
A Royalty for the First Generic
Principle 2 requires the province to encourage competition, but competition itself is enabled by the 
elimination of legal barriers to entry by generic fi rms. The core problem with obtaining generic entry is 
that patentees legitimately list many patents in Health Canada’s Patent Register, some of which might 
be found invalid or not infringed. Therefore, only if a generic fi rm challenges those patents will generic 
78 In Ontario, the Drug Interchangeability and Dispensing Fee Act (R.S.O. 1990, SS. 12.1(4) and (11)) imposes a fi ne equal 
to the rebate on both the manufacturer and the pharmacist. Since the pharmacist can only lose the rebate, there is no harm 
in asking for one. The pharmacist also might face a loss of reputation, of course, but it seems strange to limit the fi ne to the 
amount unlawfully obtained.
79 I am not suggesting that the payment of a rebate constitutes a conspiracy in the sense of the Competition Act; rather, I wish 
to draw attention to the potential value of an immunity provision.
80 See Canada, Competition Bureau, “Immunity Program under the Competition Act,” Competition Bureau Information 
Bulletin (Ottawa, October 2007); accessed online (20/06/08) at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/epic/site/cb-bc.nsf/
en/02483e.html.
81 The bioavailability of many drugs is relatively uncomplicated, but certain drugs — “Report C” formulations, in Health 
Canada’s terminology — are more complex, and a review of their interchangeability might be justifi ed. See Canada, Health 
Canada, Health Protection Branch, Expert Advisory Committee on Bioavailability, “Report C: Report on Bioavailability of Oral 
Dosage Formulations, Not in Modifi ed Release Form, of Drugs Used for Systemic Effects, Having Complicated or Variable 
Pharmacokinetics” (Ottawa, December 1992); accessed (20/06/08) at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfb-
dgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/biorepc_biorapc-eng.pdf.
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competition be enabled. At present, however, in many cases the generic fi rm that invests in litigation to 
overcome those patents obtains no advantage from doing so over other generic fi rms that invest nothing. 
Generic fi rms thus have every reason to wait for another fi rm to invest in a patent challenge.
One solution to this problem is to assume that, since Canadian patents are similar to those in other 
countries, Canadians should wait for global generic companies that are challenging patents in the United 
States to launch similar patent challenges in Canada. This approach, however, fails to address two key 
points. First, even if Canadian patents are similar to those elsewhere, they are not be identical. For 
example, no generic olanzapine or perindopril is available in the United States, but those products have 
been sold in Canada for over a year. Thus, failure to address Canadian patents based on Canadian laws 
likely would result in the unnecessary extension of patent monopolies. Second, even if patents, laws, and 
regulations are similar, the fact that they are not identical means that the expensive process of litigation 
needs to be duplicated in Canada. In the absence of any benefi t from being the fi rst to invest in litigation 
(rather than being a free rider), no fi rm can be expected to undertake such an investment.
Since it is payers — chiefl y among them, provinces — that benefi t the most from the removal of invalid 
patents and other artifi cial barriers to competition, payers should be the ones that engage in challenging 
patents. In practice, however, this is unlikely to occur. Provincial governments could apply under section 
60 of the Patent Act for a patent to be overturned, but they would incur signifi cant risks in doing so and, 
in any case, do not have the personnel to mount such challenges. In addition, in many cases, it is not 
patent invalidity but non-infringement that allows generic fi rms to proceed to market. To show non-
infringement, a province would have to possess a non-infringing generic product. 
In the past, Ontario rewarded the fi rst generic to market by giving it a higher reimbursement than when 
there were two or more generics. Such an approach, however, is probably not very effective. In most 
important markets, several generic fi rms enter rapidly, leaving little or no reward for the generic fi rm that 
bears the costs of litigation — indeed, effectively penalizing the litigating fi rm since the other free-riding 
fi rms make greater profi ts. The United States offers an incentive to a generic fi rm that challenges an 
invalid or non-infringed patent by awarding it 180 days of partial “exclusivity” before other generic fi rms 
can enter.82 The reward, however, comes at the expense of payers who might have benefi ted from the 
immediate elimination of obstacles to competition. 
A more promising route would be for the province to reward directly the generic fi rm that enables 
competition by challenging invalid or non-infringed patents, since the fi rm can be seen as acting for the 
benefi t of all payers. In a sense, this mechanism would be similar to the way patentees are rewarded 
for useful innovations by the high prices they are paid. It is important to note, however, that such a 
mechanism should pay only for success — that is, it should reward a generic fi rm that creates competition 
only when such competition has been stifl ed by an unsuccessful application in NOC proceedings by the 
patentee. 
One way to address this issue is for competing generic drug manufacturers to pay a temporary royalty to 
the fi rst independent generic that successfully challenges a patent and obtains an NOC to sell the drug. 
The royalty could cease either one year following the granting of the NOC or at the end of the latest 
patent included on the Health Canada Patent Register, whichever comes sooner. In effect, the royalty 
would raise prices to payers during the fi rst year of generic competition, but it would never lead to higher 
82 See Erika Lietzan and David E. Korn, “Issues in the Interpretation of 180-Day Exclusivity,” Food and Drug Law Journal 
62(1, 2007): 49-75.
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prices for payers than they now face, and the size of the royalty would be small compared with the gain 
to payers from lower prices.83 Even with a royalty, the highest price paid would be 50% of the brand-
name price. This would be lower than the generic prices now paid and, more to the point, much lower 
than the brand-name price consumers would pay if not for the investment incurred by the generic fi rm 
in challenging the patent. The royalty would be similar in spirit to the patent right granted to the brand-
name manufacturer, in that it would be a reward for discovering something of value to the consumer 
or payer — in this case, the elimination of an artifi cial barrier to competition. Table 6 shows how this 
temporary royalty would affect prices.
Table 6: Royalty Scheme
Generic Manufacturers Maximum Price
Royalty Paid to
First Entrant
(number) (%) (%)
1 75 0
2 55 0
3 50 5
4 47 7
5 45 10
6 40 10
7 35 10
Note: The royalty is a percentage of the brand-name price; thus, the net price earned by each generic
manufacturer remains unchanged.
The process for determining royalty eligibility is described in Appendix 7, but, in essence, only an 
independent generic, not a licensee or fi rm under the control of the patentee, would be able to obtain 
a royalty, although more than one fi rm might be able to share the royalty in some circumstances. This 
mechanism effectively would create a meaningful incentive for generic fi rms to challenge patents they 
believed were invalid or to develop non-infringing products, but would not create further barriers to 
competition, as the US system of 180-day exclusivity does.
What would such a system be worth? Appendix 8 shows some rough calculations using several products, 
but compared with the savings payers would obtain from increased competition, the royalty should 
be designed to be small. For example, for a signifi cant product such as simvastatin and with a system 
implemented on a national basis, the royalty to the fi rst generic would be on the order of $16 million, 
while the savings to consumers would be approximately $90 million. In no case should the royalty to the 
fi rst generic be more than 10% of the brand-name price times the volume of generic sales over the course 
of a year. Since this mechanism would reduce the price paid for a generic drug below the current amount, 
the royalty would be not much larger than the reduction in revenues to the fi rst generic manufacturer. Of 
course, if all provinces did not adopt this system, both payments and savings would be proportionately 
smaller. 
83 The administration of the royalty would be relatively simple. The province would indicate the price to pharmacies and, if 
a royalty were owing, the pharmacies would collect it on all sales of the generic interchangeable products and remit it to the 
Minister of Health to be paid to the qualifying generic fi rm.
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A reward of a few million dollars would not be out of line with the costs of a challenge to patent invalidity 
or the development of a non-infringing alternative. It might not pay the full costs on a risk-adjusted basis, 
but at least it would make a contribution. Moreover, it would be commensurate with the benefi ts obtained 
by consumers: the larger the market size and the greater the price reduction, the greater the royalty to the 
successful challenging generic.84
 
Note that, in a market with only one or two generic fi rms, no royalty would be paid, since the fi rst 
generic fi rm would receive the reward of a relatively high price and a large share of the generic market. 
In contrast, in a market that many fi rms entered quickly, competitors likely would strip away from the 
fi rst generic a large part of the benefi t of having created competition, and consumers would benefi t 
enormously from the low prices of a competitive market. In effect, the royalty would compensate the 
challenging generic for having enabled the low prices.
Appendix 9 lists examples of products where the efforts of a generic fi rm to open up competition were 
rewarded with the arrival of ten or more generic competitors within the space of a few months — some 
within days. If the pricing schedule outlined above had been in place, the benefi ts to consumers would 
have been enormous, while the benefi ts to the challenging generic would have been relatively small.
Provincial governments might object to such payments since they might appear to favour generic fi rms 
and discourage innovation, but generic fi rms would obtain benefi ts only from challenging invalid or non-
infringed patents; challenging patents that were valid and infringed would lead neither to generic entry 
nor to the payment of any royalty. In fact, provinces commonly pay high prices for products protected 
by patents that ultimately are found to be invalid or not infringed; in such cases, they are rewarding the 
patentee for an innovation of no value. The proposal presented here simply would provide a modest 
correction to that situation, so that the fi rm that discovered the path to competition could be modestly 
rewarded.
Tendering
How, if at all, should tendering fi t into the mechanism described above? In fact, the mechanism is designed 
explicitly to generate low prices, in a way that none of the existing non-tendering mechanisms other 
provinces use — such as Ontario’s 50% price — can do, so that tendering would not likely to be necessary 
in most cases. However, tendering could be used as a back-up solution in two different situations.
First, tendering might be used if the declining-price system failed to elicit suffi cient entry. Although each 
new entrant would force down the price, it would have no guarantee of substantial sales since it would 
not be able to distinguish its product in terms of its fundamental characteristics — after all, it would be 
marketing a generic drug — and could not offer a larger rebate to pharmacies. If the incentive to enter were 
too weak, even if prices were above costs, the declining-price mechanism would not work well. In such a 
circumstance, a province might note that international prices for a particular molecule were much lower, 
and decide to move to a tendering system. Yet, it is unlikely that a declining-price mechanism would fail 
to attract entry. If a fi rm has already entered the market in other provinces, the cost of entering a new 
one would be extremely low, and any incremental sales would be a benefi t. Moreover, since pharmacies 
prefer to deal with companies that can offer a wide range of products, a potential new entrant would fi nd 
it advantageous to be willing to supply even a relatively small amount of the product.
84 This mechanism would also address the harmful effect of authorized generics — generic drugs licensed (and typically 
produced) by the patentee that compete as generics at generic pricing levels — on the incentive to enter, without losing their 
benefi cial effects on price competition. I have argued elsewhere that these products reduce incentives to challenge patents; see 
Aidan Hollis, “The Anti-Competitive Effects of Brand-Controlled ‘Pseudo-Generics’ in the Canadian Pharmaceutical Market,” 
Canadian Public Policy 29(1, 2003): 21-31.
137
The second situation in which tendering might be used would be if fi rms were unwilling to supply at 
the specifi ed prices. Such a problem might arise, for example, if the cost of an active pharmaceutical 
ingredient were to increase substantially for reasons outside the control of individual generic producers. 
Then the question would naturally arise: at what price would generic fi rms be willing to supply? In such 
circumstances, tendering might be a useful tool with which to elicit an answer.
Given the experience of Saskatchewan, however, one should not expect this approach to result in large 
savings relative to Ontario formulary prices. Tendering should also be avoided in the initial year of 
generic entry, since it might result in the earliest generic fi rms’ obtaining little benefi t from their early 
entry. While a royalty scheme would help to minimize this problem, it might not be large enough, in 
the absence of an expectation of earning substantial sales revenues, to induce generic fi rms to engage in 
costly patent challenges. Tendering also would increase the risks generic fi rms face, since they cannot 
know whether they would obtain any share of the market even after they had invested in gearing up for 
production.
Summary
The approach described above could offer signifi cant benefi ts over the Ontario and Quebec plans and 
compared with the status quo in Alberta, since it would use a market mechanism to force down the 
prices of generic drugs. The market mechanism would be, in effect, a kind of auction in which fi rms face 
price points they need to meet to continue to participate. It would also create enormous savings for all 
payers — patients, as well as private and public insurers.
It is worth examining this proposal from the perspective of the seven principles laid out earlier.
 
1.  The proposal would continue to respect patent rights fully.
2.  It would encourage competition by offering incentives to challenge invalid patents, and its open 
formulary would permit as many fi rms as possible to enter.
3.  The benefi ts of additional competition would accrue to payers through low prices.
4.  It would enable security and stability of supply by encouraging multiple suppliers.
5.  Prices would be designed to be the same for both public and private payers.
6.  It would not require the province to rely on the bargaining of other provinces for price reductions.
7.  All payers would make a proportionate contribution to the costs of pharmacy, and dispensing fees 
and mark-ups would be set to ensure a fair income for pharmacies.
INTERPROVINCIAL PRICE COMPARISONS
A signifi cant problem inherent in trying to reduce prices below levels in Ontario is the explicit and 
implicit comparison of prices across provinces. In particular, the regulations of three provinces — Quebec, 
Manitoba, and Newfoundland and Labrador — restrict companies from offering their drugs at lower 
prices in other provinces.
Under Quebec’s Prescription Drug Act (section 60), only a medication from a manufacturer accredited by 
the Minister may be considered for entry in the provincial formulary. In order to receive accreditation, 
manufacturers must commit to provide drugs at a “guaranteed selling price” that “must not be higher 
than any selling price granted by the manufacturer for the same drug under other provincial drug 
insurance programs.”85 Any manufacturer that participates in another provincial program that Quebec 
85 Section 1 of the Act defi nes the “guaranteed selling price” as the price that a buyer must pay for a drug, minus any rebate 
provided without consideration to a buyer, plus any amount received for marketing, service, guarantee, commission, transport, 
or delivery.
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deems to violate this undertaking risks having the Minister of Health temporarily withdraw accreditation, 
thereby excluding from the provincial formulary all the medications produced by the manufacturer for a 
period of three months. This period is extended to six months if the manufacturer has been disaccredited 
in the fi ve preceding years, and accreditation may be withdrawn permanently for a third violation. If 
accreditation is withdrawn, the manufacturer must pay the RAMQ any difference between the guaranteed 
selling price as defi ned in the manufacturer’s commitment and the actual price of a medication sold by 
the manufacturer; moreover, the RAMQ has an independent right to sue for reimbursement of excess 
payments to manufacturers. Given such legislation and the size of the Quebec market, any other province 
that wished to obtain lower prices than those normally offered in Quebec would, in effect, be obliging 
manufacturers of generics also to lower their prices in Quebec.
Manitoba and Newfoundland and Labrador, like Quebec, have regulations requiring that manufacturers 
not grant lower prices elsewhere. Because these markets are not particularly large, however, such 
regulations do not have the same force in determining prices as those in Quebec. In addition, these 
provinces do not seem to be particularly effective in enforcing their regulations. A quick review of 
some commonly prescribed generic medicines shows that prices in both provinces are well above 
reimbursement prices listed in the Ontario formulary (see Table 7).
Clearly, if Alberta wished to avoid regulations that force generic manufacturers to offer very low prices, 
it would have to address Quebec’s price-matching regulations. Several approaches are possible. First, 
Alberta should try to coordinate with other provinces on its pricing mechanism. This would make it more 
attractive for some manufacturers, at least, to compete in Alberta and in the other cooperating provinces, 
since the larger the number of provinces that have the same policies, the more attractive it would become 
for new manufacturers to enter, without consideration of pricing in Quebec.
Second, Alberta should lobby Quebec to eliminate its comparative pricing mechanism. 
Table 7: Prices of Commonly Prescribed Generics, Ontario, Quebec,
               Manitoba, and Newfoundland and Labrador
Generic
Ontario 
Price
Quebec 
Price
Manitoba 
Price
Manitoba 
Price 
Difference
Newfoundland & 
Labrador Price
Newfoundland & 
Labrador Price 
Difference
($) (%) ($) (%)
Paroxetine 20 
mg
0.79 0.79 1.10 +39 1.09 +38
Ramipril 10 mg 0.47 0.47 0.66 +40 0.72 +53
Simvastatin
20 mg 1.10 1.10 1.52 +38 1.51 +37
Notes: Price differences indicate the price premium paid in Manitoba and Newfoundland
and Labrador compared with prices in Ontario and Quebec.
Source: Prices are drawn from provincial formularies as of 16 June 2008, and rounded to the
nearest cent per pill.
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Third, Alberta could, at least on the face of the language in Quebec’s legislation, evade the price 
comparison by using an open formulary and “requiring” fi rms to meet the prices specifi ed, which Quebec 
might not interpret as the manufacturer’s “granting” a price.86 This might put considerable risk on the 
manufacturer, however, since the meaning of “granting” a price has not been clarifi ed in the courts.
Fourth, since Quebec’s regulations compare prices granted only to other provinces’ drug insurance 
programs, not private insurance prices, it might be possible for Alberta to specify the private price for 
each drug and then set a price for the public insurance program that would be equal to the brand-name 
price. Alberta could then require manufacturers to grant the province what might be called a confi dential 
“health system levy” (effectively, a rebate) on sales. If the levy were set appropriately, the province could 
end up paying a net price equal to the private price. Co-payments by patients insured by AHCIP would 
be based on the private price. Ontario, for example, appears to have obtained a lower price on Coversyl 
than the listed price, once one considers the rebates negotiated by the province. British Columbia, 
similarly, appears to obtain a lower price on Zyprexa, once one considers the rebate to the province. This 
has not caused Quebec to take any disciplinary action against Servier, the maker of Coversyl, or Lilly, 
the maker of Zyprexa. Quebec thus does not seem to require that manufacturers match the lowest price 
granted to a provincial insurance program, but only the lowest published price.
TRANSITION ISSUES
Moving to a system such as the one I propose would involve a number of transition problems, the most 
diffi cult of which would be to determine the reimbursement price for existing generic drugs. It would not be 
reasonable to use the same pricing rule as in Table 5, for example, since some of the fi rms currently in the 
market might not have entered had they expected the low price required under that pricing rule. Therefore, 
an ad hoc rule seems inevitable. One possibility would be to reduce the maximum prices of existing generic 
drugs to 45% of the reference prices for all drugs with three or more generic manufacturers currently 
participating in the market. Generic fi rms and pharmacies could provide information to the government 
regarding any drugs that should be treated as an exception to this rule. The rule of a descending price 
as new fi rms sought to enter would apply in the future to these older drugs, so that, when any new fi rm 
entered, the price would drop by 5%. No competition royalty would be paid on these products. Products 
with only one or two generic manufacturers currently in the market would have their prices set at 75% or 
55% of the reference prices. Maximum prices would fall according to schedule for those products as new 
fi rms entered.
CONCLUSION
As provinces grapple with the budgetary requirements imposed by their health care systems, fi nding an 
effi cient, equitable way of procuring and paying for generic drugs is a small piece of a very large puzzle 
— but each problem needs to be addressed on its own merits. In this paper, I have described a coherent 
set of principles for the design of provincial drug insurance and price control systems. In the light of 
those principles, I have reviewed the policies of different provinces with respect to generic drug pricing, 
and suggested a novel mechanism for controlling drug prices that could lead to considerable savings for 
payers, both public and private.
The proposed declining-price system would take advantage of the knowledge fi rms have about their own 
costs of production in order to generate low prices for payers. In other markets, one can rely on ordinary 
competition among fi rms to obtain low prices — but this does not work well in generic drug markets 
86 The Saskatchewan SOC requires fi rms to offer a price; the Alberta declining-price mechanism instead would require fi rms 
to accept a price.
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because of insurance and the health status of the consumers who are buying. As a result, some alternative 
mechanism is required. Tendering is attractive response, but it would fail to address the need to reward 
the fi rst generic entrant that created the competition. Tendering also could not be used when there is an 
insuffi cient number of competitive generics and, once implemented, might undermine the ability of fi rms 
that have been unsuccessful in winning a tender to be competitive in future tendering opportunities. 
A declining-price system would address these failings while ensuring that prices paid by consumers 
refl ect the true costs of supply. Implementing such a system offers the potential of saving taxpayers and 
employers millions of dollars annually by taking advantage of competition in generic drugs.
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Appendix 1: Dispensing Fees
In Ontario, the amount the ODB pays under the guidelines set by the regulations (Ontario Drug Benefi t 
Act - O. Reg. 201/96, 13) is the drug benefi t price, plus an 8% mark-up, plus a dispensing fee of $7.00. In 
Alberta, the ACHIP pays the sum of the acquisition cost, the dispensing fee, and an inventory allowance, 
as shown in Table A-1. For prescriptions averaging $50, $100, and $200, Ontario pays total extra fees of 
$11.00, $15.00, and $23.00, respectively, while Alberta pays $10.93, $17.53, and $25.97, respectively. 
Figure A-1, which compares the relative supplementary fees, shows that typical Alberta fees are slightly 
higher than those in Ontario.
Table A-1: Dispensing Fees and Additional Inventory Allowances, Alberta
Dispensing Fee
Additional
Inventory Allowance
($)
Acquisition cost, to $74.99 10.22 0.71
Acquisition cost, $75–149.99 15.53 2.00
Acquisition cost, $150 and more 20.94 5.03
Source: Alberta, Health and Wellness, Prescription Drug Program, “Pharmacy Fee Reimbursement”
(Edmonton); available at http://www.health.alberta.ca/AHCIP/drugs-fee-reimbursement.html.
Figure A-1: Supplementary Fees, Alberta and Ontario
Alberta and Ontario Supplementary Fees
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Appendix 2: Private Payer Prices
Private payer costs differ substantially across provinces, as shown in Figure A-2, which summarizes 
prices for ten highly prescribed products. In the fi gure, prices fi rst were normalized, with the Alberta 
fi rst quarter 2008 price normalized to 100 for each product, then averaged across products for each 
province. Generally, the averages shown in the Figure A-2 closely resemble those for each product and 
are not swayed by outliers. Data on unit prices, including dispensing fees, were available only for the 
fi rst quarter of 2008, but the relationship between the average unit price ratio in Alberta, including mark-
up and dispensing fees, was approximately the same as shown in Figure A-2, as follows: Saskatchewan 
(SOC), 0.8613; Alberta, 1; Newfoundland and Labrador, 1.0336; British Columbia, 1.0649; Ontario, 
1.0729; Nova Scotia, 1.0749; Manitoba, 1.0978; New Brunswick, 1.1152; Prince Edward Island, 1.1196; 
Saskatchewan (non-SOC), 1.1698; Quebec, 1.2705. 
Available data also allowed average mark-ups over the list price to be separated out only for the fi rst 
quarter of 2008, as follows: Alberta, 5%; Nova Scotia, 11%; Saskatchewan, 12% (SOC, 5%; non-SOC, 
23%); Manitoba, 13%; British Columbia, 14%; Newfoundland and Labrador, 15%; Ontario, 15%; New 
Brunswick, 22%; Prince Edward Island, 22%; Quebec, 57%.87 Quebec’s high mark-up is a function of the 
low list price in that province and the high retail price; dispensing fees are relatively low.
Figure A-2: Private Payer Prices Averaged across Selected Products, 2008
Notes: Private payer costs were averaged across the following products: Azithromycin, 250 mg;
Citalopram, 20 mg; Fluoxetine Hcl, 20 mg; Gabapentin, 300 mg; Omeprazole Magnesium, 20 mg;
Paroxetine Hcl, 20 mg; Ramipril, 10 mg; Sertraline Hcl, 50 mg; Simvastatin, 20 mg; Venlafaxine Hcl, 75 mg. Prices in 
include acquisition costs plus mark-ups, but not dispensing fees, which vary somewhat across provinces.
87 Data are drawn, with permission, from the private payer database maintained by Brogan Inc.
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Appendix 3: Damages under the NOC RegulaƟ ons
The reason the damages provisions of the PM(NOC) Regulations cannot provide a suitable incentive for 
patent challenges is explained in section 8 of the Regulations:
(1) If an application made under subsection 6(1) is withdrawn or discontinued by the fi rst 
person or is dismissed by the court hearing the application or if an order preventing the 
Minister from issuing a notice of compliance, made pursuant to that subsection, is reversed 
on appeal, the fi rst person is liable to the second person for any loss suffered during the 
period 
(a) beginning on the date, as certifi ed by the Minister, on which a
    notice of compliance would have been issued in the absence of
    these Regulations, unless the court concludes that 
(i) the certifi ed date was, by the operation of An Act to
amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act (The
Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa), chapter 23 of the Statutes
of Canada, 2004, earlier than it would otherwise have been
and therefore a date later than the certifi ed date is more appropriate, or
(ii) a date other than the certifi ed date is more appropriate; and 
(b) ending on the date of the withdrawal, the discontinuance, the
    dismissal or the reversal. 
(2) A second person may, by action against a fi rst person, apply to the court for an order 
requiring the fi rst person to compensate the second person for the loss referred to in 
subsection (1).
The damages that may be paid to the generic fi rm are only the losses it incurs from being kept out of the 
market. One can immediately see why this does not provide a suitable incentive for challenging patents. 
First, because the monopolist’s profi ts are larger for every unit sold than the generic fi rm’s profi ts per 
unit, it will always pay the patentee to delay generic competition, even it is certain that it will have to pay 
the generic’s lost profi ts.
Second, the generic fi rm that successfully challenges the patentee’s monopoly creates cost savings for 
buyers that extend from the date of generic competition until the expiry of the invalid or non-infringed 
patent. This period might bear little or no relationship to the period during which the generic suffers 
losses because of the application of the patentee under the PM(NOC) Regulations. To illustrate, consider 
Figure A-3. In this situation, the benefi t created by fi rm X is generic competition during the entire 2002-
09 period, while the damages paid to fi rm X consist of an accounting of its lost profi ts for 2001 and 
2002. The reverse could also be true. Thus, the damages paid might bear little relationship to the social 
value of challenging a patent.
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Figure A-3: Example of a Timeline of Generic Entry
Third, the damages paid to fi rm X are only its lost profi ts, which since the fi rm would have been 
competing vigorously with fi ve other generics, might be very small. Thus, as a mechanism both for 
deterring frivolous applications by patentees under the PM(NOC) Regulations and for rewarding generic 
fi rms for challenging invalid or non-infringed patents, section 8 is likely to have little effect.
In this kind of situation, an effi cient solution would be for the patentee to pay not only lost damages to 
the generic, but also a fi ne equal to the damages to other parties (including consumers and other fi rms).88 
Such a solution would effi ciently deter frivolous or unsupported patent litigation.
88 See John R. Boyce and Aidan Hollis, “Preliminary Injunctions and Damage Rules in Patent Law,” Journal of Economics and 
Management Strategy 16(2, 2007): 385-405.
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Appendix 4: Prices under the Saskatchewan SOC System 
Table A-2: A Comparison of Generic Drug Prices in Saskatchewan and Ontario
Drug Name Dosage/Form Saskatchewan 
Price
Ontario
Price
Ratio
($ per molecule)
Acebutolol Hcl
100 mg tablet 0.1418 0.1294 1.10
200 mg tablet 0.2122 0.1936 1.10
400 mg tablet 0.4214 0.3847 1.10
Amantadine 100 mg capsule 0.3885 0.5179 0.75
Amiloride Hcl/
Hydrochlorothiazide
5 mg/50 mg tablet 0.1667 0.1917 0.87
Amoxicillin (Amoxycillin) 25 mg/ml oral suspension 0.0174 0.0353 0.49
50 mg/ml oral suspension 0.0261 0.0540 0.48
250 mg capsule 0.0898 0.1750 0.51
500 mg capsule 0.1748 0.3417 0.51
Atenolol 50 mg tablet 0.3059 0.2790 1.10
100 mg tablet 0.5025 0.4586 1.10
Baclofen 10 mg tablet 0.2078 0.2311 0.90
20 mg tablet 0.4238 0.4498 0.94
Carvedilol 3.125 mg tablet 0.7033 0.6350 1.11
6.25 mg tablet 0.7033 0.6350 1.11
12.5 mg tablet 0.7033 0.6350 1.11
25 mg tablet 0.7033 0.6350 1.11
Cephalexin Monohydrate 250 mg tablet 0.1272 0.2250 0.57
500 mg tablet 0.2544 0.4500 0.57
Cimetidine 300 mg tablet 0.0722 0.0860 0.84
600 mg tablet 0.1444 0.1720 0.84
400 mg tablet 0.1134 0.1350 0.84
Citalopram Hydrobromide 20 mg tablet 0.6195 0.6250 0.99
40 mg tablet 0.6195 0.6250 0.99
Clonazepam 0.5 mg tablet 0.0905 0.0925 0.98
2 mg tablet 0.1426 0.1595 0.89
Diclofenac Sodium 50 mg enteric tablet 0.3339 0.3125 1.07
75 mg sustained release tablet 0.4839 0.5706 0.85
146
Diltiazem Hcl 30 mg tablet 0.1760 0.1866 0.94
60 mg tablet 0.3085 0.3273 0.94
Divalproex Sodium
125 mg enteric coated tablet 0.1139 0.1093 1.04
250 mg enteric coated tablet 0.2047 0.1964 1.04
500 mg enteric coated tablet 0.4095 0.3931 1.04
Domperidone Maleate 10 mg tablet 0.1155 0.1496 0.77
Famotidine
20 mg tablet 0.4625 0.4679 0.99
40 mg tablet 0.8324 0.8423 0.99
100 mg sustained release 
tablet
0.6677 0.6665 1.00
Fluoxetine 20 mg capsule 0.6929 0.8025 0.86
Furosemide 20 mg tablet 0.0336 0.0373 0.90
40 mg tablet 0.0503 0.0558 0.90
Gabapentin
100 mg capsule 0.2069 0.2000 1.03
300 mg capsule 0.4904 0.4865 1.01
400 mg capsule 0.5996 0.5798 1.03
Glyburide 5 mg tablet 0.0536 0.0683 0.78
2.5 mg tablet 0.0309 0.0393 0.79
Hydrochlorothiazide 25 mg tablet 0.0357 0.0313 1.14
50 mg tablet 0.0517 0.0434 1.19
Indapamide Hemihydrate 1.25 mg tablet 0.1752 0.1490 1.18
2.5 mg tablet 0.2500 0.2364 1.06
Lovastatin 20 mg tablet 0.8104 0.8657 0.94
Metformin 500 mg tablet 0.0604 0.0965 0.63
Metoprolol Tartrate 50 mg tablet 0.0859 0.0968 0.89
100 mg tablet 0.1577 0.1747 0.90
Moclobemide 150 mg tablet 0.2916 0.2900 1.01
Naproxen
250 mg tablet 0.0929 0.1068 0.87
375 mg tablet 0.1268 0.1458 0.87
500 mg tablet 0.1834 0.2110 0.87
Oxybutynin Chloride 5 mg tablet 0.1728 0.1973 0.88
Paroxetine Hcl 20 mg tablet 0.7530 0.7950 0.95
30 mg tablet 0.7976 0.8450 0.94
Pindolol 5 mg tablet 0.1840 0.2023 0.91
10 mg tablet 0.3278 0.3490 0.94
Pravastatin
10 mg tablet 0.7476 0.7567 0.99
20 mg tablet 0.8820 0.8925 0.99
40 mg tablet 1.0624 1.0750 0.99
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Ranitidine 150 mg tablet 0.3003 0.4042 0.74
300 mg tablet 0.5787 0.7787 0.74
Sertraline Hydrochloride
25 mg capsule 0.3745 0.4000 0.94
50 mg capsule 0.7490 0.8000 0.94
100 mg capsule 0.8193 0.8750 0.94
Simvastatin
5 mg tablet 0.4214 0.4500 0.94
10 mg tablet 0.8333 0.8900 0.94
20 mg tablet 1.0299 1.1000 0.94
40 mg tablet 1.0299 1.1000 0.94
80 mg tablet 1.0299 1.1000 0.94
Sotalol Hcl 160 mg tablet 0.5091 0.6492 0.78
Sucralfate 1 g tablet 0.2557 0.2335 1.10
Sulfamethoxazole/Trimethoprim 400 mg/80 mg tablet 0.0420 0.0482 0.87
800 mg/160 mg tablet 0.1062 0.1221 0.87
Terazosin Hcl
1 mg tablet 0.2957 0.2770 1.07
2 mg tablet 0.3759 0.3521 1.07
5 mg tablet 0.5105 0.4782 1.07
Ticlopidine Hcl 250 mg tablet 0.5985 0.5464 1.10
Trazodone 50 mg tablet 0.1708 0.2214 0.77
100 mg tablet 0.3052 0.3956 0.77
Triamterene/Hydrochlorothiazide 50 mg/25 mg tablet 0.0416 0.0608 0.68
Verapamil Hcl 80 mg tablet 0.2378 0.2735 0.87
240 mg sustained release 
tablet
0.6841 0.6940 0.99
Average 0.92
Note: Prices do not include mark-ups or dispensing fees.
Source: Prices are drawn from the current ODB and Saskatchewan formularies. 
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Appendix 5: AlternaƟ ve Procurement Mechanisms
In this appendix, I briefl y discuss some alternative procurement mechanisms.
 
Pharmacy Benefi t Managers
In the United States, employers tend to use pharmacy benefi t managers (PBMs) to help obtain lower 
prices from pharmacies. Three PBMs dominate the US market for pharmaceuticals.89 A large PBM 
possesses substantial market power over pharmacies, and can squeeze large price concessions from 
them by threatening to prefer one chain over another for its clients. This leads to much lower recorded 
retail pharmacy prices in the United States than in Canada, where PBMs play a much smaller role. This 
does not, however, mean that PBMs are necessarily an attractive solution. The ability of PBMs to choose 
one pharmacy over another forces insured employees to shift their purchases between pharmacies, at 
some inconvenience. A more serious problem is that the ability of PBMs to exercise market power over 
pharmacies is directly correlated with their ability to exercise market power over employers. If a PBM 
represents a signifi cant enough share of business, it can extract low prices from pharmacies but need not 
pass all the savings on to the employer. A fi rm with a large market share of pharmaceutical purchases, 
however, must also have a large market share of employers, which leads to market concentration. The 
result is that, although pharmacies receive low prices, it does not mean that employers’ payments to 
PBMs are also low. In essence, PBMs simply capture the market power that would otherwise have been 
exercised by pharmacies. In Canada, the relatively small size of the private market suggests that it is 
unlikely to support more than a couple of large PBMs.
Market-Assessed Prices
Gorecki90 proposes a benchmarking mechanism in which pharmacies would negotiate the best price from 
manufacturers and be reimbursed at a fi xed price that would be reset from time to time based on the 
90th percentile of prices actually transacted for a medicine. This mechanism would increase the incentive 
for pharmacies to negotiate for low prices; pharmacies that obtained low prices would earn higher 
profi ts, while manufacturers that were willing to sell at lower prices would increase their market share. 
Pharmacies in locations that are more expensive to serve could be paid a subsidy. 
This is an attractive mechanism in many respects, but some problems might arise in its implementation 
(which has not yet happened anywhere). First, the mechanism lacks a way of setting prices in the 
period just after generic competition begins — what price would be set initially if there was only one 
generic? Second, the mechanism also lacks a way for price decreases to occur quickly as the number of 
competitors increases rapidly and real transaction prices drop, which is likely to lead to large windfalls 
for pharmacists. Third, since some pharmacy chains represent more than 10% of the market, they could 
maintain the fi xed price at a very high level.
89 See “PBMs Raise the Curtain,” Managed Care Magazine, September 2006; accessed online (20/06/08) at http://www.
managedcaremag.com/archives/0609/0609.pbms.html.
90 Gorecki, Controlling Drug Expenditures in Canada.
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Appendix 6: Proposed Pricing for Top Ten Generic Drugs
Table A-3: Proposed Pricing for Top Ten Generic Drugs
Product and Dose
Number of 
Generics
Current 
Generic 
Price
Current 
Brand-
Name 
Price
Current 
Generic 
Price as % 
of Brand-
Name 
Price
Proposed 
Generic 
Price as % 
of Brand-
Name 
Price
Net 
Current 
Generic 
Price as % 
of Brand-
Name 
Price
(-50%)
Net 
Proposed 
Generic 
Price as % 
of Brand-
Name Price
(-10%)
($) (%)
Azithromycin 250mg 8 3.11 5.29 59 25 30 23
Citalopram 20mg 8 0.88 1.40 62 25 31 23
Fluoxetine 20mg 8 1.01 1.94 52 25 26 23
Gabapentin 300mg 6 0.61 1.09 56 30 28 27
Omeprazole 20mg 3 1.10 2.20 50 45 25 41
Paroxetine 20mg 4 1.00 1.90 53 40 27 36
Ramipril 10mg 6 0.63 1.07 59 30 30 27
Sertraline 50mg 7 1.01 1.72 58 25 29 23
Simvastatin 20mg 5 1.39 2.43 57 35 29 32
Venlafaxine 75mg 3 1.09 1.90 57 45 29 41
Notes: Products are one dosage each of the ten largest Canadian generic products. The net prices refl ect the average level of 
rebates to pharmacies under the current system (50%) and the maximum level of rebates under the proposed system 
(10%). These prices are conditional on having the same number of entrants in each market.
Source: The number of generics and actual prices are drawn from the Alberta drug benefi t list, as of June 2008.
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Appendix 7: Proposed RegulaƟ ons for Determining the “First Generic”
The proposed rule for determining unambiguously which fi rm or fi rms should be eligible to receive a 
“competition royalty” is as follows.
1.  The “competition royalty” in respect of a drug should be paid to a company that has fi led a submission 
for a notice of compliance in respect of that drug that makes a statement under s.5(1)(b) of the Patent 
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations for which all three of the following requirements are met:
 (a) a notice of compliance is issued; 
 (b) the submission is the fi rst in respect of the drug to meet one of the following
 two conditions:
  (i) the submission is not subject to an application made pursuant to
  subsection 6(1) of the Patent Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
  Regulations within the time period listed in subsection 6(1); or
  (ii) if the submission is subject to an application made pursuant to
  subsection 6(1) of the Patent Medicines (Notice of Compliance)
  Regulations, the conditions of subsection 7(2)(b) of the Patent Medicines
  (Notice of Compliance) Regulations are met; and
 (c) the brand has not received anything of value from the company, either
 directly or indirectly, in any way relating to the submission.
2.  Where more than one company has fulfi lled all the conditions of section 1 on the same day, those 
companies shall share the generic royalty in equal proportions.
Appendix 8: Cost Savings and the “CompeƟ Ɵ on Royalty”
Table A-4 presents the cost savings that would accrue from a “competition royalty.” In all cases, actual 
sales volumes and brand-name prices in the year before generic entry were used. Payer savings were 
calculated by multiplying the actual volume of generic sales by the relevant savings rate, where the 
savings rate is calculated as the difference between the brand-name price and the relevant generic price. 
The royalty is 10% of the brand-name price times the volume of generic sales. The change in the fi rst 
generic’s revenues was calculated by holding the fi rst generic’s volume constant, but assuming the net 
proposed price instead of 70% of the brand-name price. In both cases, rebates paid to pharmacies were 
deducted. In the base case, the rebates are assumed to be 50%; in the proposed case, the rebates are 
assumed to be 10%. The net effect on the fi rst generic was calculated as the sum of the royalty and the 
change in its revenues in the fi rst year. If the system were applied only to Alberta, the dollar values would 
be approximately 10% as large.
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Table A-4: Cost Savings and the “Competition Royalty”
Product Year
Generics, 
year 1
Savings
at 70%
of Generic 
Price
Proposed 
Price
Ratio,
year 1
Payer 
Savings,
Proposed 
Price
Proposed 
Royalty
to First 
Generic
Change
in First 
Generic’s 
Revenues
Net Effect
on First 
Generic,
Year 1
Proposed 
Price 
Ratio,
Year 2
Payer 
Savings,
year 2
(number)
($ 
millions)
(%) ($ millions) (%) ($ millions)
Simvastatin 2003 5 50.1 45 91.9 16.7 -2.1 14.6 35 108.7
Citalopram 2004 8 30.8 35 66.8 10.3 -6.9 3.4 25 77.1
Paroxetine 2004 4 39.1 47 69.2 13.0 0.5 13.5 40 78.3
Azithromycin 2006 8 11.4 35 24.8 3.8 -1.6 2.2 25 28.6
Source: Numbers are based on IMS Drugstore sales data for Canada.
 
Appendix 9: MulƟ ple Generic Entry
Table A-5 presents examples of products with multiple generics entering over a very short time. In each 
case, the challenging generic that would have been eligible for the royalty is listed fi rst.
Table A-5: Examples of Multiple Generic Entry
Product Manufacturer
Date of Notice
of Compliance
Paroxetine
(Note: Four manufacturers 
entered within twenty days.)
Genpharm Inc. 2003-10-08
Ratiopharm Inc. 2003-10-09
Apotex Incorporated 2003-10-23
Pharmascience Inc. 2003-10-28
Novopharm Limited 2003-12-09
Laboratoire Riva Inc. 2004-01-09
Dominion Pharmacal 2004-01-09
Pro Doc Limitée 2004-02-05
Nu-Pharm Inc. 2004-02-12
Pharmel Inc. 2004-03-09
Prempharm Inc. 2004-06-21
Rhoxalpharma Inc. 2004-09-15
About the Author
Aidan Hollis is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Calgary, and an expert in pharmaceuƟ cal 
markets. He has advised governments, pharmaceuƟ cal companies, and tesƟ fi ed in court in pharmaceuƟ cal patent and compeƟ Ɵ on 
cases. He has published over twenty arƟ cles and a book on pharmaceuƟ cal markets.
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Azithromycin
(Note: Four manufacturers 
entered within four days.)
Apotex Incorporated 2005-11-01
Cobalt Pharmaceuticals Inc. 2005-11-01
Rhoxalpharma Inc. 2005-11-02
Novopharm Limited 2005-11-04
Pharmascience Inc. 2006-01-03
Ratiopharm Inc. 2006-01-30
Genmed, A Division of Pfi zer Canada Inc. 2006-01-30
Sandoz Canada Incorporated 2006-03-07
Laboratoire Riva Inc. 2006-03-15
Pharmascience Inc. 2006-04-18
Genpharm Inc. 2006-05-01
Genmed, A Division of Pfi zer Canada Inc. 2006-06-13
Pharmel Inc. 2006-08-10
Simvastatin
(Note: Five manufacturers 
entered within a month.)
Apotex Incorporated 2002-12-20
Nu-Pharm Inc. 2003-01-15
Genpharm Inc. 2003-01-15
Genpharm Inc. 2003-01-15
Ratiopharm Inc. 2003-01-15
Pro Doc Limitée 2003-02-17
Laboratoire Riva Inc. 2003-03-04
Prempharm Inc. 2003-04-30
Rhoxalpharma Inc. 2003-07-09
Cobalt Pharmaceuticals Inc. 2003-09-25
Citalopram
(Note: Four manufacturers 
entered within a month.)
Genpharm Inc. 2003-12-19
Apotex Incorporated 2004-01-12
Pharmascience Inc. 2004-01-14
Cobalt Pharmaceuticals Inc. 2004-01-19
Pharmel Inc. 2004-01-23
Dominion Pharmacal 2004-01-23
Rhoxalpharma Inc. 2004-01-26
Nu-Pharm Inc. 2004-03-03
Laboratoire Riva Inc. 2004-03-23
Novopharm Limited 2004-04-01
Ratiopharm Inc. 2004-04-26
Prempharm Inc. 2004-05-25
Pro Doc Limitée 2004-08-13
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